s  Ml    2   1968 

.C8TT 


REVIEW 


PRESIDENT    DAY'S    TREATISE 


WILL 


y 

By  BENNET  TYLER,  D.  D. 

PRESIDENT   Or   THE    THEOLOGICAL   INSTITUTE   OP   CONNECTICUT 


HARTFORD. 
PRINTED      BY      ELIHU      GEER, 

26£      STATE-STREET. 

18  3  8. 


REVIEW. 


An  Inquiry  respecting  the  self-determining  power  of  the  Will ;  or  contingent  volition.  By 
Jbrkmiah  Day,  President  of  Yale  College.  New  Haven,  Herrick  and  Noyes,  1838.  pp. 
200,  ISmo. 


We  "have  read  this  little  volume  with  deep  interest,  and  with  a 
high  degree  of  satisfaction.  President  Day  possesses  the  rare  tal- 
ent of  rendering  an  abstruse  subject  remarkably  plain.  His  habits 
of  study,  and  long  experience  as  a  teacher  in  mathematical  and 
physical  science  and  mental  philosophy,  added  to  a  mind  naturally 
clear  and  discriminating,  have  eminently  fitted  him  for  the  task  he 
has  undertaken.  His  object  is  not  to  propound  any  new  theories 
on  the  subject  of  moral  agency.  He  lays  claim  to  no  new  dis- 
coveries in  theological  science  ;  nor  is  he  disposed  to  follow  in  the 
track  of  modern  innovators.  His  views,  so  far  as  we  can  discover, 
do  not  differ  from  those  of  Edwards  ;  yet  he  has  found  ample 
scope  for  his  peculiar  talents,  in  elucidating  and  defending  the  prin- 
ciples for  which  that  illustrious  divine  contended.  The  reader, 
therefore,  must  not  expect  to  find  in  the  work  before  us,  any  new 
theological  views,  or  philosophical  theories ;  but  he  will  find  old 
and  long  established  principles  clearly  stated,  and  their  truth  con- 
clusively demonstrated.  He  will  find  truths  which  have  been  obscu- 
red by  the  use  of  vague  and  ambiguous  terms,  brought  out  to  the 
light  of  day,  and  commended  to  his  understanding  by  a  force  of 
evidence  which  cannot  be  easily  resisted.  Many  a  reader,  we  can- 
not doubt,  who  has  been  sorely  perplexed  by  recent  theological  spec- 
ulations, will  find  his  mind  relieved  by  a  perusal  of  this  volume. 
It  is  a  most  timely  production ;  and  we  cannot  but  cherish  the 
hope  that  it  will  do  much  towards  dispelling  the  mists  which  a  false 
philosophy  has  thrown  around  some  of  the  fundamental  doctrines 
of  the  Gospel. 

The  spirit  which  pervades  the  work,  is  such  as  we  should  anti- 
cipate from  what  we  know  of  the  candor,  mildness,  and  Christ- 
ian simplicity  of  the  author.  It  is  free  from  every  thing  like 
acrimony,  or  bigotry,  or  dogmatism,  or  the  spirit  of  party.  The 
manifest  design  of  the  writer,  is  to  ascertain  the  truth,  and  to 
exhibit  it  with  plainness,  whatever  may  be  its  bearing  on  existing 
theological  controversies. 

The  style   is  neat,  simple,  pure,  and  remarkably  perspicuous. 


For  precision  of  thought  and  language,  for  accuracy  of  definition 
and  clear  explanation  of  ambiguous  terms,  and  for  lucid  argument- 
ation, the  work  is  not  surpassed  by  any  metaphysical  treatise 
within  our  knowledge.  While  perusing  it  we  were  forcibly  remind- 
ed of  a  remark  which  was  once  made  in  reference  to  another  pro- 
duction ;  '*  It  is  like  the  waters  of  one  of  our  northern  lakes,  deep 
and  clear  —  so  clear  indeed,  that  a  careless  observer  might  think 
it  shallow." 

It  may  perhaps  be  thought  by  some,  that  the  theory  of  a  self- 
determining  power  of  the  will,  has  long  since  been  exploded  — 
that  nobody  now  believes  it,  and  that  he  who  attempts  to  refute  it 
is  only  beating  the  air.  Such,  however,  is  not  the  opinion  of 
President  Day.  His  clear  and  penetrating  mind  has  traced  cer- 
tain errors  of  the  present  day,  to  their  first  principles.  He  has 
discovered  the  starting  point  from  which  the  reasoning  of  their 
advocates  proceeds ;  and  he  has  rightly  judged,  that  the  most 
effectual  way  to  destroy  these  errors,  is,  to  demolish  the  foundation 
on  which  they  rest.  He  says,  "  the  self-determining  power  of  the 
will  is  a  subject  intimately  connected  with  many  of  the  theological 
discussions  of  the  present  day."  We  are  entirely  of  the  same 
opinion.  By  this,  however,  we  do  not  mean,  and  we  presume  our 
author  did  not  mean,  that  this  theory  is  at  the  present  day  openly 
and  professedly  maintained.  Probably  no  one  who  has  been  enga- 
ged in  the  recent  discussions  which  relate  to  the  moral  agency  of 
man,  and  the  moral  government  of  God,  would  say,  in  so  many 
words,  that  "  every  free  act  of  the  will  is  determined  by  an  antece- 
dent free  act;"  or  that  " volitions  are  contingent  events."  Yet, 
unless  we  greatly  mistake,  there  are  those  who  have  advanced  and 
strenuously  defended  principles,  which  necessarily  involve  the 
theory  in  one  or  the  other  of  these  forms.  At  all  events,  there  are 
those,  (as  we  shall  attempt  to  show  before  we  have  done,)  who  have 
called  in  question  the  great  doctrine  which  it  is  the  object  of  Presi- 
dent Day  to  defend;  viz:  The  absolute  dominion  of  God  over  the 
moral  universe  ;  and  his  entire  control  of  the  thoughts,  feelings,  and 
conduct  of  his  accountable  creatures. 

His  object  in  writing  the  treatise,  and  the  reasons  which  indu- 
ced him  to  adopt  this  particular  mode  of  discussion,  will  appear 
from  the  following  remarks  in  his  "Introductory  Observations." 

"The  momentous  interest  which  belongs  to  this  subject,  lies  in  its  relation 
to  the  moral  government  of  God.  If  nothing  from  without  the  will  of  the 
agent  can  have  any  influence  in  determining  what  his  volitions  shall  he,  then 
it  must  be  beyond  the  power  of  the  Father  of  our  spirits  to  give  direction  to 
the  acta  of  the  will,  without  interfering  with  the  prerogatives  of  accounta- 
ble agency."  *  *  *  "If  the  creator  has  filled  this  and  other  worlds 
with  living  agents,  whose  acts  of  will  are  entirely  independent  of  himself,  he 
can  only  look  on,  and  observe  the  operation  of  their  voluntary  powers  ;  accom- 
modating the  course  of  his  external  providence  to  what  Ihey  may  happen  to 
determine.     On  this  supposition,  he  can  punish  iniquity,  but  can  do  nothing  to 


prevent  it,  without  impairing  the  independence  of  moral  agency.  He  can 
render  a  reward  to  virtue,  but  can  take  no  effectual  measures  to  promote  it, 
except  by  such  a  determining  influence,  as  is  supposed  to  be  inconsistent  with 
the  very  nature  of  virtue.  He  can  rule  the  worlds  of  matter,  which  roll  in 
harmony  and  brightness  through  the  heavens,  but  cannot  control  the  heart  of 
man."  *  *  *  "On  a  subject  so  momentous,  and  so  difficult  to  be  thor- 
OUghly  comprehended  in  all  its  relations,  it  might  be  expected  that  we  should 
almost  instinctively  turn  to  the  records  of  inspired  truth  for  instruction.  He 
who  gave  to  the  human  soul  its  being,  and  all  its  powers  of  thought  and  voli. 
tion,  must  surely  know,  whether  any  efficacious  influence  from  without  is 
inconsistent  with  accountable  agency.  But  here  we  are  met  by  an  assump- 
tion which  precludes  a  reference  to  the  decision  of  Scripture.  It  is  claimed 
that  rcaton,  and  consciousness,  and  common  sense,  have  already  decided  the 
point ;  and  that  God  cannot  contradict,  in  his  word,  what  he  has  distinctly 
made  known  to  us,  by  the  faculties  which  he  himself  has  implanted  in  the 
soul.  Whatever  passages,  therefore,  which  seem  to  favor  a  particular  doctrine, 
may  be  found  in  the  Scriptures,  they  are  to  be  so  interpreted,  as  not  to  signify 
any  thing  which  reason  pronounces  to  be  absurd.  We  are  called  upon,  then, 
to  inquire,  whether  the  position  that  nothing  but  the  will  itself  has  any  influ- 
ence in  determining  what  its  acts  shall  be,  is  so  intuitively  or  demonstrably 
certain,  as  to  preclude  all  possibility  of  finding  the  contrary  declared  in  the 
word  of  God.  So  long  as  this  position  is  adhered  to,  it  is  vain  to  think  of 
appealing  to  the  authority  of  the  Scriptures,  on  the  question  respecting  the 
self-determining  power  of  the  will.  They  will  of  course  be  so  explained,  as 
to  express  a  meaning  in  conformity  with  the  principles  assumed.  This  is  my 
apology  for  making  an  application  of  dry  metaphysics  to  a  subject  so  nearly 
connected  with  one  of  the  departments  of  Scriptural  theology.  Those  who 
are  prepared  to  receive  implicitly  the  divine  testimony,  just  as  they  find  it  on 
the  sacred  page,  may  pass  over  this  part  of  the  subject  as  being  unnecessary 
for  them  ;  and  proceed  to  the  section  in  which  the  evidence  from  Scripture  is 
presented."     pp.11  — 14. 

It  appears  from  these  remarks,  that  our  author  regards  the  sub- 
ject under  discussion,  as  "  nearly  connected  with  one  of  the  depart- 
ments  of  Scriptural  theology,"  where  the  ultimate  standard  of 
appeal  must  be  the  word  of  God.  By  this  criterion  all  our  philo- 
sophical conclusions  must  be  tested.  "  To  the  law  and  to  the  testi- 
mony ;  if  they  speak  not  according  to  this  word,  it  is  because  there  is 
no  light  in  them."  President  Day  has  no  sympathy  with  those 
who  exalt  reason  above  revelation  ;  or  who  explain  away  the  obvi- 
ous meaning  of  the  Bible,  to  make  it  accord  with  the  decisions  of 
their  philosophy.  Whether  God  can  control,  at  pleasure,  the  mor- 
al actions  of  men,  is  a  question  which  he  who  created  the  human 
soul,  and  who  endued  it  witli  all  the  attributes  which  it  possesses, 
is  certainly  better  able  to  decide  than  a  creature  of  yesterday. 
And  if  in  the  revelation  which  he  has  given  to  man,  he  has  spoken 
on  this  subject,  it  becomes  us  to  receive  his  testimony  with  child- 
like simplicity.  That  the  Bible  is  explicit  on  this  point,  our  author 
fully  believes.  He  considers  it  indeed  so  explicit,  that  "  those 
who  are  prepared  to  receive  the  divine  testimony  just  as  they  find 
it  on  the  sacred  page,"  have  no  need  to  perplex  their  minds  with 
metaphysical  speculations. 

But  the  objectors  to  this  doctrine  contend  that  it  involves  absurd- 


itics  too  palpable  to  be  admitted  by  a  rational  mind  ;  and  conse- 
quently that  those  passages  of  Scripture  which  seem  to  teach  it, 
must  not  be  understood  in  their  most  obvious  sense,  but  must  be  so 
interpreted  as  not  to  contradict  the  decisions  of  reason.  It  becomes 
necessary  therefore,  to  meet  the  objector  on  his  own  ground,  to 
examine  his  reasoning  and  test  his  conclusions ;  to  inquire  whether 
there  is  not  some  error  in  his  philosophy  ;  whether  his  reasoning 
is  not  based  on  false  principles  ;  and. whether  after  all,  there  is  not 
a  perfect  agreement  between  the  dictates  of  sound  philosophy,  and 
the  plain  declarations  of  the  word  of  God.  It  was  this,  which 
induced  Edwards  to  write  his  treatise  on  the  will.  And  this  is 
President  Day's  apology  for  engaging  in  metaphysical  discussion 
in  defence  of  a  doctrine  of  revelation. 

We  wish  the  reader  to  keep  constantly  in  mind  the  great  object 
of  the  treatise.  It  is  as  we  have  stated,  to  vindicate  the  doctrine 
of  God's  absolute  dominion  over  the  hearts  and  conduct  of  his 
accountable  creatures.  It  is  the  relation  which  the  discussion  has 
to  this  "  department  of  Scriptural  theology,"  which,  in  the  view 
of  our  author,  gives  to  it  its  practical  importance,  and  clothes  it 
with  "momentous  interest."     He  says, 

"  The  inquiry,  then,  concerning  contingent  self-determination,  involves  no 
less  a  question  than  this;  ichether  God  can  exercise  ani/  determining  influence 
over  the  moral  actions  of  his  creatures.  Are  we  prepared  to  decide  this 
momentous  question  in  the  negative?  While  the  worlds  and  systems  of 
worlds  in  the  material  universe  are  under  the  perfect  control  of  their  Maker, 
is  the  moral  world  unavoidably  left  to  the  dominion  of  chance  ?"  pp.  147,  148. 

To  decide  this  "momentous  question,"  he  repeatedly  insists,  our 
only  sure  and  safe  course  is  to  resort  to  the  Scriptures  ;  and  to 
them  he  makes  his  final  appeal.  After  carrying  his  readers  through 
a  course  of  clear  and  forcible  argumentation,  exposing  the  absurd- 
ities involved  in  the  objections  to  the  doctrine  in  question,  he 
observes, 

"  My  object  has  not  been  to  lay  a.  philosophical  foundation  for  religious  belief; 
but  to  prepare  the  way  for  simple  and  coniident  reliance  on  the  testimony  of 
Scripture.  I  have  not  undertaken  to  prove,  by  such  arguments  as  must  at 
once  carry  conviction  to  every  mind,  that  a  controlling  influence  is  exercised 
over  the  will,  in  a  way  which  is  consistent  with  account  aide  agency.  It  has 
been  my  aim  to  ascertain,  whether  the  absurdity  of  the  doctrine  has  been  so 
demonstrated,  as  to  preclude  all  possibility  of  finding  it  asserted  in  the  Scrip- 
tures." p.  174. 

Having  thus  prepared  the  way  for  an  appeal  to  the  oracles  of 
(rod,  he  brings  forward  in  his  closing  section,  an  array  of  passa- 
ges which  so  conclusively  establish  the  point  in  debate,  that  their 
force  cannot  be  evaded,  except  by  explanations  which  do  violence 
to  all  legitimate  rules  of  interpretation.  He  shows  that  God 
i-  said  to  cause  his  people  to  walk  in  his  statutes — to  incline  their 


hearts  to  obey  him  —  (o  turn  the  hearts  of  men  whithersoever  he 
will  —  to  leave  men  to  themselves  —  to  give  them  over  to  a  repro- 
bate mind  —  to  make  them  obedient  or  perverse  —  to  cause  them 
to  execute  his  determinate  counsel,  and  to  do  what  bis  band  and 
counsel  had  before  determined  to  be  done  —  to  create  in  bis  people 
a  clean  heart,  and  to  renew  a  right  spirit  within  them  —  to  keep 
them  from  falling  —  and  to  subdue  and  to  harden  the  hearts  of  men 
at  his  pleasure.  He  closes  bis  appeal  to  the  scriptures  with  the 
following  remarks. 

"  After  attentively  examining  the  various  passages  of  Scripture  which 
speak  of  the  purposes  and  agency  of  God,  in  relation  to  the  hearts  and  actions 
of  men  ;  declaring  that  he  causes  righteousness  to  spring  forth  ;  that  he  inclines 
the  hearts  of  his  people  to  obey  him  ;  that  he  turns  them  at  his  pleasure  ;  that 
he  makes  them  obedient  or  perverse  ;  that  he  directs  their  hearts  unto  the  love 
of  God  ;  that  his  counsel  determines  before,  the  things  to  be  done  by  human 
agency  ;  that  he  gives  a  new  heart  and  a  right  spirit ;  that  he  works  in  his  peo- 
ple in  will  and  to  do;  that  he  is  able  to  keep  them  from  falling,  till  he  presents 
them  faultless  before  the  presence  of  his  glory  ;  and  that,  on  the  other  hand, 
he  often  hardens  the  heart  and  makes  it  obstinate  :  after  weighing  well  the 
import  of  these  several  expressions,  can  any  one  fail  to  admit,  that  according 
to  the  Scriptures,  God  has  a  determining  influence  over  human  volitions  ?  Can 
he  escape  from  this  conclusion,  on  any  other  ground,  than  that  he  has  come 
to  the  examination,  with  a  preconceived  and  settled  opinion,  that  such  a  doc- 
trine cannot  be  true,  and  therefore  cannot  be  found  in  the  oracles  of  God  ? 
Arc  we  thus  to  explain  away  the  explicit  declarations  of  Scripture,  till  we 
have  brought  them  to  coincide  with  our  own  philosophy  ?  Can  the  advocates 
of  a  directing  and  a  determining  divine  influence,  express  their  opinions  in 
stronger  or  more  definite  terms,  than  those  used  by  the  inspired  writers  ?"  pp. 
193,  194. 

We  have  referred  to  this  part  of  the  treatise  in  the  first  place,  for 
the  purpose  of  keeping  distinctly  before  the  minds  of  our  readers 
the  great  point  of  "  Scriptural  theology,"  which  the  author  is  vin- 
dicating against  the  philosophical  objections  by  which  it  has  been 
assailed.  The  question  at  issue  is,  whether  the  moral  world  is  as 
completely  under  the  control  of  God  as  the  natural  world.  Not 
whether  they  arc  controlled  in  the  same  manner,  and  are  subject 
to  the  same  laws.  No  one  supposes  that  mind  is  subject  to  those 
laws  of  nature  "by  which  the  motions  ami  positions  of  material 
objects  are  regulated."  But  mind  may  have  its  laws  as  well  as 
matter,  and  may  be  as  completely  subject  to  its  laws.  The  con- 
nection between  cause  and  effect  may  be  as  absolute  in  the  moral, 
as  in  the  material  universe.  It  was  the  doctrine  of  the  Westmin- 
ster divines,  and  has  been  the  doctrine  of  Calvinists  generally,  that 
«  God's  works  of  providence,  are  bis  most  holy,  wise  and  powerful, 
preserving  and  governing  all  bis  creatures,  and  all  their  actions.  ' 

The  great  objection  to  this  doctrine  is,  that  it  is  inconsistent 
\miIi  that  freedom  of  the  will  which  is  essential  to  moral  agency. 
This  is  a  philosophical  objection,  and  President  Day  has  fairly 
met    it  with  a  philosophical  answer.      That  man  is  a  free  moral 


8 

agent  is  admitted  on  both  sides,  and  indeed  cannot  be  questioned. 
The  decisions  of  each  one's  own  conscience,  and  the  whole 
tenor  of  the  Bible,  make  this  point  too  plain  to  admit  of  doubt 
for  a  moment.  But  what  is  essential  to  moral  freedom  ?  Does  it 
imply  independence  of  divine  control  1  May  not  God  exercise  a 
determining  influence  over  the  volitions  of  men,  and  still  they  be 
free  ?  This  brings  us  at  once  to  the  inquiry  respecting  the  self- 
determining  power  of  the  will.  If.  volitions  are  dependent  on 
some  influence  from  without  the  mind,  they  may  be  controlled  with- 
out impairing  the  freedom  of  the  agent.  But  if  they  are  not 
dependent  they  must  be  self-determined. 

To  prepare  the  way  for  the  discussion  of  this  point,  President 
Day  in  the  first  place,  defines  some  of  the  terms  which  he  has 
occasion  to  use,  such  as  cause,  effect,  contingence  and  power. 
"A  cause  is  an  antecedent  on  which  something  depends."  "  An 
effect  is  a  consequent  of  something  on  which  it  depends."  "  An 
effect  may  in  many  cases  be  produced  not  by  a  single  antecedent, 
but  by  the  combined  influence  of  several.  All  the  circumstances 
upon  which  the  effect  depends  may  be  considered  as  a  complex 
cause."  "Some  writers  speak  of  efficient  causes  as  a  distinct 
class.  But  all  causes  are  so  far  efficient  or  efficacious  that  they 
are  antecedents  on  which,  in  part  at  least,  effects  depend."  Con- 
tingence is  used  in  two  senses.  In  common  discourse  it  denotes 
that  something  has  taken  place,  the  immediate  cause  of  which  is 
not  known.  But  philosophers  have  used  it  to  denote  the  absolute 
negation  of  causation.  It  is  used  by  President  Day  "  to  signify 
the  exclusion  of  causation  or  dependence  in  the  case  of  volition  ; 
the  denial  that  there  is  any  thing  preceding  which  determines  the 
act  of  the  will  to  be  what  it  is.  According  to  this  signification, 
the  opposite  of  contingence  is  dependence."  We  obtain  our  idea 
of  power  by  observing  the  relation  between  cause  and  effect. 
"  The  efficacy  of  the  cause,  its  being  of  such  a  nature  as  to  pro- 
duce effects,  is  its  power.  In  other  words,  power  is  that  belonging 
to  a  cause,  upon  which  the  effects  depend."  "  In  the  most  extensive 
use  of  the  word,  the  power  to  do  any  thing  includes  all  the  ante- 
cedents, the  whole  aggregate  of  circumstances  upon  which  the 
effect  depends."  "We  rarely  have  occasion,  however  to  speak  of 
power  in  this  absolute  sense."  "  In  speaking  of  human  agency 
we  are  accustomed  to  say,  that  a  man  has  power  to  do  any  thing 
which  he  does  whenever  he  will." 

After  some  remarks  on  the  powers  of  the  mind,  and  the  differ- 
ent modes  of  classifying  them,  he  comes  to  a  consideration  of  the 
will  and  its  operations. 

"  There  has  been  no  settled  agreement  with  respect  to  that  most  important 
faculty  called  the  will.  European  writers  generally  confine  the  term  to  the 
power  of  ordering  some  bodily  or  mental  act.  Volition,  according  to  them, 
is  determining  to  do  something.      A  man  wills  to  move  his  hand,  or  to  think 


9 

on  a  particular  subject.  In  such  cases,  the  act.  which  is  willed  immediately 
follows  the  volition.  A  man  determines  to  speak,  and  he  speaks  ;  he  wills  to 
walk,  and  he  walks.  We  frequently  resolve  on  a  course  of  conduct,  for  the 
sake  of  obtaining  some  distant  good.  A  mnn  determines  to  devote  himself 
to  the  acquisition  of  property,  to  gaining  applause,  to  sensual  gratification,  or 
to  a  life  of  benevolent  effort.  Such  a  resolution  is  called  a  commanding  pur- 
pose of  life,  predominant  inclination,  governing  state  of  the  will,  dominant 
preference,  generic  volition,  &c.  to  distinguish  it  from  those  particular  acts  by 
which  these  general  determinations  are  carried  into  execution.  In  addition  to 
both  these  classes  of  volitions,  the  New  England  divines,  since  the  days  of 
Edwards  at  least,  have  very  commonly  considered  emotions  or  affections  as  acts 
of  the  will.  The  elder  Edwards  says,  '  I  humbly  conceive,  that  the  affections 
of  the  soul  are  not  properly  distinguished  from  the  will ;  as  though  they  were 
two  faculties  in  the  soul.'  '  The  affections  arc  no  other  than  the  more  vigor- 
ous and  sensible  exercises  of  the  inclination  and  will  of  the  soul.'  But 
although  emotions,  purposes  and  executive  volitions  arc,  in  some  respects  sim- 
ilar ;  yet  in  other  respects,  they  are  different.  Emotion  is  directed  to  an 
object ;  a  purpose  fixes  on  an  end ;  an  executive  volition  orders  an  act.  Exec- 
utive acts  may  depend  on  a  predominant  purpose ;  and  the  purpose  may 
depend  on  antecedent  emotions.  A  general  purpose  may  look  to  some  distant 
end  ;  an  executive  volition  relates  to  something  which  is  immediately  to  fol- 
low." pp.  38  —  40. 

From  this  it  will  be  seen  that  President  Day  after  the  example 
of  Edwards,  includes  in  the  acts  of  the  will,  all  the  moral  feelings 
or  affections.  He  rightly  judges,  however,  that  emotions,  purpo- 
ses, and  executive  volitions  are  not,  in  all  respects,  alike,  and  that 
they  may  with  great  propriety,  be  arranged  into  distinct  classes. 
It  is  important  to  keep  this  classification  in  mind,  in  order  to 
understand  the  subsequent  discussion. 

When  we  speak  of  the  determination  of  the  will,  our  inquiry  is 
not  whether  man  is  the  agent  of  his'  own  volitions,  nor  why  he 
wills  at  all;  but  why  he  wills  as  he  docs  —  why  he  chooses  one 
thing  rather  than  its  opposite  ?  What  determines  him  thus  to 
choose  ? 

"  Is  it  a  preceding  act  of  the  will  ?  This  is  undoubtedly  the  case  in  many 
instances.  Taking  the  will  in  its  most  enlarged  acceptation,  as  including  not 
only  executive  acts,  but  purposes  and  emotions,  acts  of  one  class  may  be  deter- 
mined by  those  of  another.  A  man  purposes  to  go  to  the  post-office ;  every 
step  he  takes  on  his  way,  is  determined  by  this  purpose.  And  the  purpose  may 
have  been  determined  by  some  strong  emotion;  an  eager  desire,  perhaps,  to 
receive  intelligence  of  the  recovery  of  a  friend  from  sickness,  or  the  safe  arri- 
val of  a  richly  freighted  ship.  Farther,  the  emotions  themselves  are  com- 
monly excited,  either  by  perceptions  of  external  realities,  or  by  the  internal 
imaginings  of  our  own  minds.  Imperative  acts  of  the  will,  then,  may  be 
preceded  by  purposes,  the  purposes  by  emotions,  the  emotions  by  perceptions 
or  the  workings  of  imagination.  But  all  these  belong  to  the  mind.  They  do 
not  reach  beyond  ourselves."  *  *  "But  every  step  cannot  be  dependent 
on  another  within  the  mind.  For  this  would  involve  the  absurdity  of  at  least 
one  step  before  the  first,  or  else  of  an  infinite  series  of  steps.  The  first  act, 
then,  must  proceed  from  something  within  the  mind  which  is  not  an  act,  or 
from  something  without,  or  from  both  together,  or  from  nothing.''1  *  *  "  If 
the  first  act  of  the  series  proceeds  from  some  mental  state,  which  is  neither  an 
act  nor  the  substance  of  the  mind  ;  that  stnte  must  have  had  an  origin,  either 


10 

from  without  or  from  something  within,  which,  if  we  trace  hack  the  chain  of 
dependencies,  and  do  not  admit  contingence,  any  where,  to  break  the  series, 
will  bring  us  to  something  without  the  mind."  *  *  *  "  If  it  be  said  that 
our  mental  exercises  are  dependent  on  our  propensities,  which  are  a  part  of 
ourselves,  still  it  is  to  be  considered  that  our  propensities  are  either  acquired, 
in  consequence  of  previous  states  of  mind  in  connection  with  external  circum- 
stances, or  are  a  part  of  the  original  constitution  of  the  mind,  received  from 
its  Creator.  Or  if  it  be  supposed  that  a  man  practices  iniquity  or  virtue, 
because  he  has  formed  a  sinful  or  holy  purpose  ;  or  because  by  his  own  acts, 
he  has  contracted  a  sinful  or  virtuous  habit;  yet  his  first  sinful  or  virtuous  act 
on  which  the  others  are  considered  as  dependent,  did  not  proceed  from  a  pur- 
pose or  habit  of  his."  *  *  *  "  Some  writers  speak  of  the  power  of  will- 
ing, as  being  the  sole  and  sufficient  cause  why  the  mind  wills  one  way,  rather 
than  another."  *  *  "  But  an  equal  power  to  will  any  way  indifferently, 
is  not  surely  the  only  ground  of  willing  one  way  rather  than  another."  *  * 
"  Liberty  to  either  side  does  not  turn  the  will  uniformly  to  one  side.  Power  to 
the  contrary,  does  not  bind  the  soul  in  unwavering  devotedness  to  its  Maker. 
An  equal  chance  of  doing  right  and  doing  wrong,  does  not  secure  a  course  of 
uniform  rectitude.  If  it  be  said  that  there  is  really  no  cause  or  reason  why 
the  will  turns  one  way  rather  than  the  contrary,  this  brings  us  to  contingent 
self-determination."   pp.  43  —  48. 

"  The  question,  then,  for  our  consideration  is,  whether  the  volitions  of 
accountable  agents  are  contingent  or  dependent ;  not  whether  they  are  depend- 
ent on  the  mind,  objects  of  choice,  &.c.  for  coming  into  existence  merely  ;  but 
for  being  such  volitions  as  they  are,  right  or  wrong,  sinful  or  holy.  The  mind 
it  is  admitted,  puts  forth  volitions,  but  does  it  determine  of  what  sort  they 
shall  be  ?  Docs  any  thing  else  determine  this  ?  Does  any  thing  else  make 
any  difference  in  the  volitions  ?  Or  is  it  a  mere  matter  of  accident,  that  they 
are  as  they  arc  ?  If  they  are  not  dependent  they  must  be  contingent,  in  the 
absolute  sense  in  which  we  are  now  using  the  term.  If  they  are  not  contin- 
gent they  must  be  dependent."  *  *  *  "If  the  kind  of  volitions  which  a 
man  puts  forth,  is  to  be  ascribed  to  accident,  in  what  part  of  the  series  of 
mental  acts,  does  this  prolific  contingence,  this  wonder-working  nonentity, 
'  this  effectual  no-cause,'  do  its  work  ?  When  does  it  break  the  connection 
between  volition  and  all  preceding  influence?  Arc  executive  acts  of  the  will 
independent  of  purposes,  and  emotions,  and  appetites  ?  Does  the  tippler  resort 
to  the  dram-shop  without  any  inducement  ?  Or  if  at  any  time  he  denies 
himself  his  accustomed  indulgence,  has  he  no  motive  for  his  abstinence  ?"  * 
*  *  "Is  the  forming  of  purposes,  the  place  where  the  dependence  upon 
preceding  influence  is  broken  oft"?  When  a  man  resolves  to  devote  his  powers 
and  labors  to  the  calls  of  ambition,  is  it  done  independently  of  any  love  of 
distinction  ?  When  the  Christian  abandons  his  former  pursuits,  and  forms  a 
purpose  of  devoting  himself  to  the  service  of  Cod,  does  he  do  it  without  a 
reason  ;  a  reason  of  sufficient  efficacy  to  control  his  decision  ?  Do  men  form 
resolutions  for  the  sake  of  obtaining  those  objects  to  which  they  are  perfectly 
indifferent?  If  it  be  admitted,  that  our  imperative  volitions  are  influenced 
by  our  purposes,  and  our  purposes  by  our  desires  and  appetites,  shall  we  find 
in  the  latter  the  independence  which  contingent  self-determination  implies? 
When  objects  arc  brought  before  our  minds,  is  it  altogether  a  matter  of  acci- 
dent, whether  we  shall  be  pleased  with  them  or  not  ?  Is  it  as  easy  to  be  grat- 
ified with  contemptuous  treatment  as  with  applause  ?  Is  it  an  even  chance, 
whether  a  miser  will  be  most  pleased  with  a  guinea  or  a  sixpence  ?"  pp. 
49  —  52. 

"  But  it  may  be  asked,  does  not  a  man  originate  his  own  volitions  ?  They 
undoubtedly  begin  with  him  in  this  sense,  that  they  have  no  existence  till  he 
puts  them  forth.  But  docs  this  imply  that  dependence  in  the  case,  can  be 
traced  no  further  back  than  to  the  agent  ?"  *  *  *  "  If  it  be  said  that  the 
nature  of  his  volitions  depends  on  nothing  but  the  nature  of  the  man ;  yet,  it 


11 

is  to  be  considered,  that  this  nature  of  his  must  have  had  an  origin  from 
some  cause.  Or  if  there  he  a  state  of  the  mind,  which  is  different  from  its 
nature  and  its  operations,  and  which  is  the  cause  of  its  volitions,  that  state  is 
not  the  product  of  chance."  p.  53. 

"  Is  man  the  efficient  cause  of  his  own  volitions  ?  There  surely  can  be  no 
reasonable  doubt  on  this  point,  if  by  efficient  cause,  be  meant  the  agent  who 
wills."  *  *  *  "  But  if  we  apply  the  term  efficient  cause  to  every  thing, 
which  is  in  any  way  concerned  in  determining  what  a  man's  volitions  shall 
be,  we  cannot  say  that  he  is  the  only  efficient  cause  of  them."  p.  54. 

That  volitions  are  not  contingent  but  dependent,  our  author 
proceeds  to  show,  from  the  influence  of  motives.  He  defines  a 
motive  to  be  "  that  which  moves,  inclines,  induces  or  influences  the 
mind  to  will,  or  which  has  a  tendency  thus  to  move  it."  Motives 
are  of  two  kinds,  external  and  internal.  An  external  motive,  is 
some  object  contemplated  by  the  mind,  which  has  a  tendency  to 
move  the  will.  An  internal  motive,  is  some  feeling  or  desire  of 
the  mind,  which  is  awakened  by  an  object  of  contemplation,  and 
which  prompts  the  purposes  and  executive  acts  of  the  will. 

"  The  motive  to  an  imperative  act,  may  be  a  wish  to  execute  some  previous 
purpose.  The  motive  to  a  purpose,  is  the  desire  to  obtain  some  object  which 
is  viewed  as  eligible.  That  which  immediately  excites  the  volition  in  this 
case,  is  an  affection  of  the  mind,  an  emotion,  an  internal  motive.  But  that 
which  excites  the  emotion  itself,  may  be  an  object  without  the  mind,  an  exter. 
nal  motive.  A  tree  loaded  with  fair  and  delicious  fruit,  excites  desire  in  the 
beholder.  This  desire  may  move  him  to  pluck  the  fruit.  The  fruit  itself  is 
an  external  motive.  The  desire  which  stimulates  to  the  act  of  gathering  it, 
is  an  internal  motive.  One  act  of  the  will,  therefore,  in  the  more  enlarged 
acceptation  of  the  term  will,  may  be  the  motive  to  another  act.  The  affec- 
tions, which,  by  some,  are  considered  as  volitions,  may  be  the  motives  to  pur- 
poses and  executive  volitions."  pp.  56,  57. 

The  influence  of  external  motives  depends  not  merely  upon  the 
object  which  is  contemplated,  but  upon  "the  correspondence 
between  that  and  the  state  of  the  mind."  The  same  object  may 
excite  very  different  feelings  in  different  minds,  and  in  the  same 
mind  at  different  times.  A  view  of  the  character  of  God  will 
awaken  complacency  in  a  holy  mind,  and  enmity  in  an  unholy 
mind.  But  "  the  same  mind,  or  minds,  in  every  respect  alike,  in 
precisely  the  same  state,  in  the  same  circumstances,  and  under  the 
same  influence,  will  certainly  choose  in  the  same  way." 

To  suppose  that  the  mind  may  choose  without  motives,  involves 
the  absurdity  of  supposing  that  it  may  choose  without  having  any 
thing  to  choose,  or  any  reason  why  it  does  choose.  But  if  the  mind 
in  every  act  of  choice,  is  influenced  by  some  motive,  then  volitions 
are  not  contingent  but  dependent.  Whether  we  call  motives 
causes,  conditions  or  occasions  of  volition  ;  they  are  antecedents 
on  which  volition  depends,  and  without  which  it  cannot  exist.  It 
is  as  impossible  for  the  mind  to  choose  without  motives,  as  it  is  for 
a  man  to  breathe  without  air,  or  to  see  without  light.     It  has  been 


12 

said,  that  since  the  power  of  choosing  does  not  exist  in  the  motives, 
it  must  exist  exclusively  in  the  mind,  and  consequently  that  the 
mind  has  power  to  choose  even  without  motives.  With  the  same 
truth  it  might  be  said,  that  since  the  power  of  breathing  does  not 
exist  in  the  air,  nor  the  power  of  seeing  in  the  light,  therefore  man 
has  power  to  breathe  without  air,  and  to  see  without  light.  If  man 
has  power  to  choose  without  motives,  let  us  suppose  him  to  exer- 
cise that  power.  What  kind  of  choice  would  that  be,  in  which 
nothing  is  chosen  ? 

May  not  the  mind  control  the  motives  by  which  it  is  influenced  ? 
In  other  words,  may  it  not  decide  among  different  motives  by  which 
it  will  be  governed  ?  But  by  what  motive  is  that  act  governed  by 
which  this  decision  is  made  1  Is  it  prompted  by  some  preceding 
motive,  and  is  that  selected  by  some  preceding  act,  and  so  on,  ad 
infinitum  ? 

"The  power  of  the  mind  over  the  objects  which  it  contemplates,  is  not 
such  that  it  can  make  them  all  agreeable,  and  in  any  degree,  at  its  bidding." 
*  *  "  May  not  our  volitions,  however,  be  in  opposition  to  our  feelings  ?  We 
may  undoubtedly,  oppose  some  of  our  desires,  for  the  sake  of  gratifying  oth- 
ers. But  what  motive  can  a  man  have  to  will  against  all  motives  ?  Willing, 
at  least,  in  the  case  of  imperative  acts,  is  determining  to  do  something,  and 
that  for  the  sake  of  obtaining  the  objects  of  our  desire.  When  such  objects 
are  before  the  mind,  can  we  will  to  turn  away  from  thorn,  for  the  sake  of 
something  which  is  not,  on  any  account,  desired?  If  objects  of  desire  have 
no  tendency  to  move  the  will  in  a  particular  direction,  they  are  not  properly 
speaking,  motives.  If  they  have  such  a  tendency,  they  must  actually  move 
the  will,  provided  there  is  nothing  which  has  a  tendency  to  move  it  in  a  differ- 
ent direction.  When  on  one  side  there  is  no  influence,  any  influence  on  the 
opposite  side  must  turn  the  scale.  Whatever  does  not  do  this,  has  no  influence 
in  the  case."  pp.  G3,  64. 

From  the  foregoing  extracts  it  will  be  seen  that  President  Day 
has  conclusively  shown,  that  volitions  are  not  self-determined,  but 
are  dependent  on  some  influence  out  of  the  mind.  If  this  is  con- 
sistent with  moral  agency,  as  it  must  be  if  man  is  a  moral  agent, 
then,  moral  agency  does  not  imply  independence  of  divine  control ; 
for  whatever  be  the  influence  under  which  the  mind  acts,  that 
influence  must  be  traced  ultimately,  to  the  will  of  the  Creator. 
This  conclusion  is  thus  happily  expressed  by  our  author. 

"  If  the  volitions  of  accountable  agents  are  dependent,  for  their  nature  on 
any  thing  preceding ;  if  contingence  docs  not  come  in,  to  break  the  chain  of 
connection  ;  then  the  Creator  may  have  a  determining  influence  over  the  vo- 
litions themselves,  by  the  power  which  he  possesses  over  the  causes,  condi- 
tions, occasions,  and  other  antecedents  on  which  choice  depends.  If  the  nat- 
ural constitution  of  the  agent  has  any  concern,  in  deciding  the  character  of  his 
volitions,  this  constitution  is  moulded  by  the  hand  of  God.  If  external  motives 
have  any  sway  over  the  will,  these  are  presented  under  a  superintending  provi- 
dence. If  internal  perceptions  and  emotions  have  any  influence  on  volition, 
1hesc  arc  dependent  on  other  antecedents  which  are  under  the  regulation  of 
divine  power.  By  either  leaving  his  creatures  to  themselves,  to  yield  to  their 
own  propensities,  and  the  various  influences  with  which,  in  the  natural  course 


13 

of  events,  they  arc  surrounded;  or  by  the  special  interposition  of  his  provi- 
dence, whenever  be  sees  tit,  and  by  the  agency  of  his  spirit,  he  can  exercise  a 
controlling  power  over  the  acts  of  the  will."  p.  147. 

In  the  section  on  liberty  and  necessity,  the  author  shows,  that 
the  highest  liberty  of  which  man  is  capable,  and  of  which  it  is 
possible  to  conceive,  is  perfectly  consistent  with  that  dependence  of 
volitions  on  something  preceding,  for  which  he  contends. 

To  the  objections  that  this  doctrine  is  contradicted  by  conscious- 
ness and  common  sense  ;  that  it  makes  man  a  machine,  controlled 
by  physical  agency  ;  that  it  represents  man  as  passive  ;  that  it 
destroys  accountability  ;  that  it  exhibits  God  as  the  author  of  sin  ; 
and  that  it  runs  into  fatalism  and  pantheism,  President  Day  has 
made  appropriate  and  forcible  replies.  Had  we  not  already  quoted 
so  much,  we  should  be  glad  to  present  our  readers  with  copious 
extracts  from  this  part  of  the  work.  As  it  is,  we  cannot  refrain 
from  inserting  a  short  extract  relating  to  each  of  these  topics. 

Consciousness.  "  A  man  is  conscious  that  he  wills  or  determines.  But  arc 
we  conscious  that  our  volitions  are  dependent  on  nothing  preceding  ?  that 
motives  from  without  have  no  influence,  in  determining  our  minds  to  choose 
as  they  do  ?"  *  *  "  Arc  we  conscious  that  our  affections  and  passions, 
however  strong  they  may  be,  have  no  influence  upon  our  purposes  and  execu- 
tive volitions  ?  Are  we  conscious,  that  neither  external  circumstances,  nor  the 
habitual  character  of  our  minds,  have  any  concern  in  determining  the  nature 
of  our  emotions  ?  Are  we  conscious  that  motives  are  mere  objects  of  choice, 
to  which  we  arc  perfectly  indifferent,  till  we  have  made  our  election  ?  Arc 
we  conscious  that  we  are  able  to  prefer  chains  and  a  dungeon,  in  themselves 
considered,  to  liberty  and  the  light  of  heaven  ?  Arc  we  conscious  of  ever 
acting  against  all  the  motives  which  are  before  our  minds,  and  that  without 
any  inducement  to  such  a  determination  ?"  pp.  Ill,  112. 

Accountability.  "  But  what  is  necessary  to  render  a  man  accountable  for 
acts  of  the  will  itself?  They  must,  unquestionably,  be  his  own  acts,  and  not 
those  of  another.  But  must  he  not  also  have  power  to  will  the  contrary  ?  Now 
what  can  this  inquiry  mean  ?  Power  over  an  action  implies  some  antece- 
dent or  antecedents,  on  which  the  action  depends.  Volitions,  if  they  depend  upon 
anything  beside  the  agent  himself,  must  depend  on  his  feelings,  his  affections, 
his  dispositions,  his  apprehensions.  When  it  is  affirmed,  that  an  accountable 
agent  must  have  power  to  will  in  opposite  directions  ;  are  we  to  understand 
the  meaning  to  be,  that  he  has  equal  power  to  either  side  ;  or  only  that  he  has 
some  power  to  the  contrary  ?  If  the  latter  only  be  intended,  there  is  no  diffi- 
culty in  seeing,  that  the  balance  of  feeling  may  be  so  decisively  on  one  side, 
as  to  control  the  man's  volitions.  Is  it  necessary  to  accountable  agency,  that 
the  feelings  for  and  against  the  decisions  of  the  will,  should  be  equal  ?  Is  the 
murderer  free  from  guilt,  unless  he  has  as  strong  an  inclination  to  spare  his 
victim,  as  to  take  his  life  ?  Is  the  sinner  excusable  for  his  impenitence,  unless 
he  has  an  equal  disposition  to  obey  God,  and  to  disobey  him  ?  Are  the  angels 
in  heaven  deserving  of  no  praise  for  their  constancy,  unless  they  have  an  equal 
propensity  to  revolt?"  pp.  115,  116. 

Common  sense.  "  Common  sense  teaches,  that  motives  do  not  choose  and 
act  of  themselves,  without  an  agent ;  that  they  do  not  lie,  or  swear,  or  steal. 
But  is  it  a  doctrine  of  common  sense,  that  the  agent  acts  ■without  motives  ; 
or  that  motives  are  merely  objects,  upon  which  volition,  put  forth  fortuitously, 
may  fasten  ;  that  they  have  no  influence  whatever  upon  his  decision  ;  that  the 
sparkling  bowl    offers  no  allurement  to  the  voluptuary  ;  that  to  the  thief,  a 


14 

purse  of  guineas  presents  no  temptation  to  steal ;  that  external  objects  have 
no  effect  in  moving  the  passions ;  or  that  the  passions,  when  excited,  have  no 
tendency  to  give  a  direction  to  the  will  ?"  pp.  125,  126. 

Mechanical  and  physical  agency.  "  We  sometimes  hear  it  said,  that  if  the 
will  is  directed  by  motives,  it  is  not  a  self-moving  power,  it  is  a  mere  machine. 
It  is  easy  to  use  words  without  meaning.  What  is  a  machine  ?  It  is  com- 
monly understood  to  be  an  instrument,  composed  entirely  of  matter,  having 
certain  movements,  and  set  in  operation  by  a  material  force.  Has  the  will,  or 
its  acts,  any  of  these  properties  ?  Is  it  a  material  substance  ?  Has  it  any 
bodily  motions  ?  Is  it  impelled  by  a  mechanical  force  ?  Does  a  machine, 
like  the  mind  in  willing,  act  from  choice  ?  Is  it  under  the  influence  of 
rational  motives  ?  Is  it  moved  by  persuasion,  by  argument,  by  commands, 
by  hope  of  reward,  or  fear  of  punishment  ?"  *  *  *  "  Nearly  allied  to 
the  objection,  which  represents  dependent  volition  as  being  mechanical,  is 
another,  which  considers  such  volition  as  being  physical  agency,  rather  than 
moral.  The  multifarious  meanings  of  the  term  physical,  renders  it  difficult 
to  determine  what  is  intended  by  this  objection.  It  is  one  of  those  pliable 
words,  which  may  be  made  to  mean  one  thing  or  another,  any  thing  or 
nothing,  as  occasion  may  require.  Its  proper  signification  is,  according  to 
■nature.  Is  it  claimed  that  nothing  can  be  moral  agency,  but  that  which  is 
contrary  to  nature,  or  which  has  no  connection  with  nature  ?"  *  *  "Is  it 
the  certain  connection  between  cause  and  effect,  which  is  considered  as  inad- 
missible in  the  case  of  volition  ?  Is  it  this  that  is  called  physical  causation  ? 
And  is  it  true,  that  certainty  belongs  only  to  the  relations  of  the  material 
world?"  pp.  129  —  135. 

Author  of  sin.  "  What  is  it  to  be  the  author  of  sin  ?  According  to  the 
proper  use  of  language,  it  is  to  commit  sin.  Will  any  one  charge  upon  God, 
the  sin  which  his  creatures  commit  ?  He  is  the  author  of  their  being.  He 
may  be  the  author  of  the  circumstances  in  which  they  are  placed.  But  docs 
this  make  him  the  author  of  their  sin  ?  If  it  docs,  how  is  the  difficulty  remo- 
ved, by  considering  volitions  as  altogether  contingent ;  by  representing  it  to 
he  the  very  nature  of  a  moral  agent,  to  be  liable  to  sin  by  accident  ?  Who 
gave  to  man  this  nature,  from  which  contingent  volitions  proceed  ?  Is  God 
to  be  considered  the  author  of  sin,  if  he  has  cither  created  such  agents  as 
would  be  liable  to  sin,  or  brought  before  his  creatures,  such  objects  as  might 
influence  them  to  sin  ?"   pp.  149,  150. 

Prevention  of  sin.  "  If  the  volitions  of  moral  agents  are  under  the  con- 
trol of  the  Creator,  the  inquiry  may  be  made,  why  has  he  not  wholly  prevented 
the  existence  of  sin  ?  This  difficulty  does  not  press  exclusively  upon  the 
opinion,  that  volitions  are  dependent  upon  something  preceding,  for  being 
what  they  arc.  Let  it  be  supposed  that  they  are  contingent.  It  is  generally 
admitted,  by  those  who  believe  that  this  is  the  case,  that  they  are  forseen  by  God. 
Why,  then,  docs  he  give  existence  to  beings  who  he  knows  will  sin  ;  and  that 
many  of  them  will  so  sin,  that  it  would  have  '  been  good  for  them,  if  they 
had  never  been  born  ?'  Will  it  be  said,  that  he  could  not  avoid  bringing  them 
into  being,  consistently  with  the  best  good  of  the  universe  ?  And  how  do  wc 
know,  even  supposing  that  their  volitions  arc  under  his  control,  that  he  could 
interpose  to  prevent  all  sin,  in  a  way  consistent  with  the  best  good  of  the 
universe  ?  Do  you  say,  that  if  he  could  not,  it  must  be  because  he  could  not 
prevent  all  sin  ivithout  destroying  moral  agency  ?  Is  the  destroying  of  moral 
agency  the  only  evil  which  could  possibly  result  from  deranging  the  plans  of 
infinite  wisdom  and  benevolence  ?  If  it  be  admitted,  that  all  sin  cannot  be 
prevented,  in  the  best  moral  system ;  docs  it  follow,  that  it  could  not  be  pre- 
vented in  any  moral  system  ?"  pp.  151,  152. 

Activity  and  dependence.  "  It  has  been  said,  that  a  man  cannot  be  a  free 
agent,  if  he  is  a  mere  passive  recipient  of  influence  from  without.  This  is  very 
true.  If  he  is  merely  passive,  he  is  no  agent  at  all.  If  he  is  merely  passive,  he  is 
not  active,  and  therefore  docs  not  act.    But  what  absurdity  is  there  in  suppo- 


15 

sing,  that  he  may  be  active  and  passive  too ;  active  in  willing,  and  passive  in 
being  caused  to  will  ?  If  a  thing  is  caused  to  be  active,  does  it  follow,  that  it 
is  not  active  ;  that  it  is  merely  passive  '.'  If  a  man  is  made  willing  to  act  in  a 
certain  way,  docs  it  prove  that  he  is  not  willing  ?  Is  it  urged,  that  to  suppose 
a  man  to  be  caused  to  act  freely,  is  inconsistent  with  the  definition  of  free 
agency  ?  Would  it  not  be  more  to  the  purpose,  to  endeavor  to  render  our 
definitions  conformable  to  the  reality  of  things ;  rather  than  to  take  it  for 
granted,  tbat  facts  correspond  with  our  arbitrary  definitions  ?"  p.  1G4. 

Fatalism.  "  An  argument  in  favor  of  independent  self-determination,  is 
drawn,  by  some,  from  the  consideration  that  it  enables  us  to  keep  at  a  safe 
distance  from  the  doctrine  of  Fatalism.  This  calling  in  the  aid  of  an  odious 
appellation,  is  a  very  convenient  and  summary  mode  of  confuting  an  oppo- 
nent. Whatever  was  meant  by  the  fatalism  of  the  ancients,  it  did  not  imply, 
that  all  the  changes  in  the  world  are  under  the  guidance  of  a  being  of  infi- 
nite wisdom,  and  infinite  goodness.  This  was  so  far  from  being  the  case, 
that  the  gods  themselves  were  represented  by  the  doctrine  as  being  under  the 
control  of  the  fates."  *  *  "Is  there  no  way  of  escaping  the  odium  of 
fatalism,  but  by  adopting  the  fortuitous  contingencc  of  Epicurus  ?  Is  it 
fatalism  to  believe,  that  he  who  formed  the  soul  of  man,  can  so  touch  the 
springs  of  its  action,  as  to  influence  the  will,  without  interfering  with  the 
freedom  of  its  choice  ?  Is  a  chain  of  causes,  suspended  from  the  throne  of 
nonentity,  to  be  likened  to  the  purposes  and  agency  of  the  Omniscient  Crea- 
tor?" pp.  167  — 169. 

We  have  given  copious  extracts,  that  we  might  not  be  accused 
of  misrepresenting  our  author,  and  that  our  readers  might  have  a 
fair  opportuty  of  judging  of  the  merits  of  the  work. 

President  Day  affirms  in  his  introductory  remarks,  that  "  the 
self-determining  power  of  the  will,  is  a  subject  intimately  con- 
nected with  many  of  the  theological  discussions  of  the  present 
day."  To  what  discussions  does  he  refer?  What  recent  specu- 
lations does  he  suppose  to  be  based  on  the  theory  which  he  has 
undertaken  to  refute  ?  Who  are  their  authors,  and  in  what  publi- 
cations arc  they  to  be  found  ?  We  know  not  that  any  theological 
disputant  professes  to  adopt  the  theory  in  question.  But  that  the 
great  doctrine,  which  it  was  the  object  of  President  Day  to  vindi- 
cate, has  been  called  in  question,  Ave  have  promised  to  show.  We 
will  now  endeavor  to  redeem  our  promise.  The  doctrine  is,  that 
God  can  control,  at  pleasure,  the  moral  actions  of  his  accountable 
creatures.  "  If,"  says  our  author,  "  the  volitions  of  accountable 
agents  are  dependent,  for  their  nature,  on  any  thing  preceding ;  if 
contingencc  does  not  come  in  to  break  the  chain  of  connection  ; 
the  Creator  may  have  a  determining  influence  over  the  volitions 
themselves,  by  the  power  which  he  possesses  over  the  causes,  con- 
ditions, occasions,  and  other  antecedents  on  which  choice  depends." 
But  if  God  can  control,  at  pleasure,  the  moral  actions  of  his 
creatures,  then  certainly,  if  it  had  been  his  pleasure,  he  could  have 
prevented  sin,  and  secured  universal  holiness,  in  a  moral  system. 
This  doctrine,  we  say,  has  been  called  in  question.  Now  for  the 
proof. 

Dr.  Taylor,  in  his  Conch  ad  Clerum,  preached  in  the  Chapel  of 


16 

Yale  College,  Sept,  10,  1828,  in  reply  to  the  inquiry  why  God  per- 
mitted man  to  sin,  says, 

"  Do  you  know  that  God  could  have  done  better,  better  on  the  whole,  or 
better,  it"  he  gave  him  existence  at  all,  even  for  the  individual  himself?  The 
error  lies  in  the  gratuitous  assumption,  that  God  could  have  adopted  a  moral 
system,  and  prevented  all  sin,  or  at  least,  the  present  degree  of  sin."  p.  29. 

He  resumes  the  subject  in  a  note,.and  says, 

"  Would  not  a  moral  universe  of  perfect  holiness,  and  of  course,  of  perfect 
happiness,  be  happier  and  better,  than  one  comprising  sin  and  its  miseries  ? 
And  must  not  infinite  benevolence  accomplish  all  the  good  it  can  ?  Would 
not  a  benevolent  God,  had  it  been  possible  to  him  in  the  nature  of  things,  have 
secured  the  existence  of  universal  holiness  in  his  moral  kingdom  ?"  *  *  * 
"  Who  does  most  reverence  to  God,  he  who  supposes  that  God  would  have 
prevented  all  sin  in  his  moral  universe,  but  could  not ;  or  he  who  affirms  that 
he  could  have  prevented  it,  but  xoould  not  ?"  *  *  *  "  Is  there  then  the 
least  particle  of  evidence,  that  the  entire  prevention  of  sin  in  moral  beings,  is 
possible  to  God  in  the  nature  of  things  ?"  *  *  "  The  assumption  therefore, 
that  God  could,  in  a  moral  system,  have  prevented  all  sin,  or  the  present 
degree  of  sin,  is  wholly  gratuitous  and  unauthorized,  and  ought  never  to  be 
made  the  basis  of  an  objection,  or  an  argument."  pp.  32,  33. 

Is  not  this  calling  in  question  the  doctrine  of  God's  entire  con- 
trol over  the  moral  universe?  The  view  which  is  here  taken  of  the 
government  of  God,  has  bsen  strenuously  maintained  and  defend- 
ed in  the  pages  of  the  Christian  Spectator  ever  since  the  publica- 
tion of  the  above  mentioned  sermon.  It  was  the  great  point  of 
controversy  between  Dr.  Taylor  and  Dr.  Woods.  It  was  one  of 
the  points  of  controversy  between  Dr.  Taylor  and  the  writer  of  this 
article,  in  the  Spirit  of  the  Pilgrims.  Enough  has  been  written 
and  published,  on  this  subject,  by  the  New  Haven  divines,  to  make 
a  volume  of  no  inconsiderable  size.  We  shall  be  able  to  refer  to 
only  a  few  of  their  statements. 

In  their  Review  of  Dr.  Woods'  Letters,  Christian  Spectator, 
Sept.  1830,  they  say,  "  what  Dr.  Taylor  holds,  is,  that  the  nature 
of  moral  agency  is  such,  that  it  may  be  true  that  God  cannot  pre- 
vent sin  in  all  instances  under  a  moral  system."  Dr.  Woods  had 
affirmed,  what  it  is  the  great  object  of  President  Day's  treatise  to 
establish,  that  "God  has  a  perfect  unlimited  power  over  all  the 
springs  and  occasions  of  action  inhuman  beings,  —  over  every 
thing  which  has  the  nature  of  a  motive  or  excitement  to  action; 
and  especially  over  the  disposition  of  the  heart."  To  this  they 
reply,  "  This  again  is  mere  assertion."  Dr.  Woods  had  shown 
that  Dr.  Taylors's  reasoning  from  the  case  of  a  father  and  his 
children  was  inconclusive,  because  God  has  a  power  over  the 
hearts  of  men  which  parents  have  not  over  the  hearts  of  their  chil- 
dren. «  He  hath  mercy  on  whom  he  will  have  mercy.11  The  king's 
heart  is  in  the  hand  of  the  Lord,  as  the  rivers  of  water,  he  turneth  it 
whithersoever  he  wilV     But  the  case  of  the   father  is  different. 


17 

If  he  is  affectionate  and  faithful,  he  does  every  thing  he  can,  to 
make  his  children  virtuous  and  happy."     To  this,  they  reply  : 

"  A  benevolent  God  does  not<io  what  he  can,  to  make  his  creatures  virtuous 
and  happy  !  We  think  this  position  might  be  left  to  answer  for  itself.  But 
we  would  ask,  if  God  can  make  all  his  accountable  creatures  perfectly  holy, 
why  he  does  not  do  it?"  p.  559. 

They  say  again, 

"  If  holiness  consists  in  voluntary  action,  then  the  fact  that  God  secures  it 
in  moral  agents  for  a  time,  is  no  proof  that  he  can  secure  its  continuance  foi- 
ever.  The  nature  of  free  agency  precludes  such  assenions  respecting  God, 
as  truly  as  it  does  respecting  an  earthly  parent."  p.  5(il.     They  say  also. 

"  The  question  is,  what  could  God  have  done  to  secure  more  holiness  and 
less  sin  in  a  moral  system?  This  is  the  task,  then,  which  devolves  on  Dr. 
Woods,  viz :  to  prove  that  God  could  have  kept  all  sin,  or  the  present  degree  of 
sin  out  of  a  universal  moral  system.  Now  we  say,  that  this  is  a  task 
which  Dr.  Woods  cannot  accomplish;  and  for  this  very  obvious  reason,  that 
the  nature  of  the  case  absolutely  precludes  all  proof,  being  one  which  may  in- 
volve a  palpable  self-contradiction.  It  will  not  be  denied  that  free  moral 
agents  can  do  wrong,  under  every  possible  influence  to  prevent  it.  Thepossi- 
bility  of  a  contradiction  in  supposing  them  to  be  prevented  from  doing 
wrong,  is  therefore  demonstrably  certain.  Free  moral  agents  can  do  wrong, 
under  all  possible  preventing  influence.  Using  their  powers  as  they  may 
use  them,  they  will  sin  ;  and  no  one  can  show  that  some  such  agents  will  not 
use  their  powers  as  they  may  use  them.  This  possibility  that  free  agents  will 
sin,  remains,  (suppose  what  else  you  will,)  so  long  as  moral  agency  remains; 
and  how  can  it  be  proved  that  a  thing  will  not  be,  when  for  aught  that  ap- 
pears, it  may  be?"    pp.  502,  503. 

We  ask  again,  is  not  this  calling  in  question  the  doctrine 
which  it  is  the  object  of  President  Day's  treatise  to  defend  ?  The 
reasoning  in  the  above  extracts  is  all  based  on  the  assumption, 
that  moral  agents,  so  far  as  moral  action  is  concerned,  are  in- 
dependent:— that  they  not  only  have  natural  ability  to  do  wrong, 
(in  the  sense  in  which  Edwards  uses  that  term)  but  that  there 
can  be  no  certainty,  and  consequently  no  proof  that  they  will 
not  do  wrong,  whatever  God  may  do  to  prevent  it.  "  The  na- 
ture of  the  case,"  we  are  told,  "  absolutely  precludes  all  proof." 
"  Free  moral  agents  can  do  wrong  under  all  possible  preventing 
influence.  Using  their  powers  as  they  may  use  them,  they  will 
sin  ;  and  no  one  can  show  that  some  such  agents  will  not  use 
their  powers  as  they  may  use  them."  Some  such  agents! 
Why  do  they  thus  limit  their  conclusion?  Their  reasoning, 
if  it  proves  any  thing,  proves  that  there  can  be  no  certainty  that 
////  moral  agents  will  not  sin.  Who  then  can  show  that  every 
saint  and  every  angel  will  not  yet  apostatize?  They  are  free 
moral  agents.  "  Using  their  powers  as  they  may  use  them,  they 
will  sin  ;  and  who  can  prove  that  a  thing  will  not  be,  when  for 
aught  that  appears,  it  may  be?"  Who  then  can  prove  that  all 
3 


18 

the  subjects  of  God's  moral  kingdom  will  not  yet  raise  the 
standard  of  revolt?  It  is  no  more  true  of  some  moral  agents 
that  they  can  do  wrong  under  all  possible  preventing  influence, 
than  it  is  of  all  moral  agents;  and  if  this  fact  of  itself  pre- 
cludes all  possibility  of  proof  that  some  such  agents  will  not 
sin,  it  equally  precludes  the  possibility  of  proof  that  all  such 
agents  will  not  sin.  "This  possibility  that  free  agents  will  sin, 
remains,  (suppose  what  else  you  will.")  No  matter  how  con- 
clusively it  may  be  demonstrated,  that  volitions  are  depend- 
ent upon  some  influence  out  of  the  mind,  and  that  this  influence 
must  be  ultimately  under  the  control  of  God.  No  matter  how 
full  and  how  explicit  may  be  the  testimony  of  the  Scrip- 
tures, that  God  has  complete  dominion  over  the  hearts  of  his 
creatures ;  it  must  all  pass  for  nothing.  It  cannot  be  admit- 
ted as  proof,  because  "  the  nature  of  the  case  absolutely  pre- 
cludes all  proof."  To  suppose  God  able  to  control  the  con- 
duct of  moral  agents,  may  involve  a  contradiction.  This,  we 
are  told,  is  demonstrably  certain.  We  should  like,  however, 
to  see  the  demonstration,  before  we  yield  our  assent. 

Suppose  moral  agents  have  power,  that  is,  natural  ability  to 
sin  under  all  circumstances;  but  natural  ability  is  not  inconsis- 
tent with  moral  necessity.  Cannot  God  render  it  certain  that 
moral  agents  will  not  do  what  they  have  natural  ability  to  do? 
Can  he  not  prevent  sin,  without  destroying  the  power  to  sin? 
Most  certainly  he  can,  if  he  can  control  the  moral  causes  on 
which  volitions  depend.  And  if  he  does  possess  this  power,  is 
it  demonstrably  certain  that  there  can  be  no  proof  of  the  fact? 
The  hinge  on  which  the  whole  dispute  turns,  is  the  very  question 
discussed  by  President  Day.  Are  volitions  dependent,  or  con- 
tingent ?  Is  there  any  cause  or  reason  why  free  agents  choose, 
as  they  do,    except    the   fact,  that  they  do  thus  choose? 

In  the  same  article  from  which  the  above  extracts  are  ta- 
ken, we  find  the  following  declaration  : 

"That  moral  agents  as  such — moral  agents  in  their  very  nature  as  moral 
agents,  should  be  entirely  dependent  on  some  ab  extra  agency  for  right  and 
wrong  moral  action,  is  another  solecism.  To  say  that  it  must  be  so  in  the  na- 
ture of  tilings,  is  to  say  that  God  is  not  a  free  moral  agent,  and  that  he  has 
not  made,  and  cannot  make,  creatures  in  his  own  image.  All  moral  exer- 
cise or  action,  is  voluntary  action,  and  all  voluntary  action  implies  power 
in  the  agent  to  the  opposite  voluntary  action."  p.  565. 

By  "  ab  extra  agency,"  they  mean  all  efficacious  influence 
from  without  the  mind,  which  is,  in  any  way,  under  the  con- 
trol of  God  ;  and  they  seem  to  suppose  that  created  moral  agents 
are  as  independent  of  God  for  their  voluntary  actions,  as  God 
is  independent  of  any  other  being.     On  any  other  supposition, 


19 

it  is  impossible  to  understand  their  illustration.  But  are  not 
moral  agents  dependent  on  ab  extra  influence?  Does  the  mind 
ever  choose  without  motives?  that  is,  without  having  any 
thing  to  choose,  or  any  reason  why  it  does  choose?  Can 
there  be  any  such  thing  as  choice  in  which  nothing  is  chosen? 
But  if  the  mind  cannot  choose  without  motives;  and  if  the 
will  is  always  determined  by  the  strongest  motive,  as  President 
Day,  and  President  Edwards  have  both  demonstrated,  then  a 
moral  agent  is  dependent  on  ab  extra  influence  for  right  and 
wrong  moral  action.  The  reasons  why  he  chooses  one  thing 
rather  than  another,  must  be  traced  back  to  something  out  of 
the  mind.  It  is  true  that  executive  volitions  are  determined 
by  purposes,  and  purposes  by  emotions  or  affections;  but  the 
affections  are  excited  by  external  motives;  and  "these  are  pre- 
sented under  a  superintending  providence."  Thus  we  see 
that  all  choice  depends  ultimately  on  ab  extra  influence.  There 
is  no  way  to  avoid  this  conclusion,  but  to  plunge  into  all  the 
absurdities  of  the  self-determining  power  of  the  will. 

It  is  a  favorite  position  of  the  New  Haven  divines,  and  one 
which  they  have  often  repeated  and  vindicated,  that  "  God 
prefers,  all  tilings  considered,  holiness  to  sin  in  all  instances  in 
which  the  latter  takes iplace."  Why,  then,  we  ask,  does  he 
suffer  sin  to  exist?  Why  does  he  not  prevent  sin,  by  securing 
holiness  in  its  stead,  in  all  instances?  The  only  answer  which 
can  be  given  to  this  question,  is,  that  he  is  not  able  to  do  it. 
Most  certainly  he  must  be  disposed  to  secure,  what  he,  on  the 
whole,  prefers.  Accordingly  they  say,  "  God  not  only  pre- 
fers, on  the  whole,  that  his  creatures  should  forever  perform 
their  duties  rather  than  neglect  them,  but  purposes  on  his  part, 
to  do  all  in  his  power  to  promote  this  very  object  in  his  king- 
dom." Ch.  Spec.  1832,  p.  660.  If  this  be  so,  then  certainly 
God  has  not  complete  control  over  the  hearts  of  his  creatures. 
It  cannot  be  true  that  the  king's  heart  is  in  the  hand  of  the 
Lord,  as  the  rivers  of  water;  and  that  he  turneth  it  whithersoever 
he  will;  for  no  king,  nor  any  other  human  being  has  ever  lived, 
who  has  not  failed  to  perform  his  duties.  It  cannot  be  true  that 
he  hath  mercy  on  whom  he  will  have  mercy,  and  whom  he  icill 
he  hardencth:  for  he  would  have  mercy  on  all,  if  he  could;  and 
so  far  from  hardening  whom  he  will,  it  is  not  his  will  that  any 
should  he  hardened;  but  he  prefers,  on  the  whole,  that  the 
hearts  of  all  should  be  softened,  and  he  "  purposes  to  do  all  in 
his  power  to  promote  this  very  object  in  his  kingdom."  If 
"  God  prefers,  all  things  considered,  holiness  to  sin,  in  all  in- 
stances," then  not  a  single  sin  has  ever  been  committed  which 
God  could  have  prevented,  by  securing  holiness  in  its  stead. 


20 

In  every  instance  of  transgression,  man  has  been  too  strong  for 
his  Maker.  His  free  agency  has  triumphed  over  the  utmost 
skill  and  power  of  Jehovah  to  restrain  and  control  it.  If  this 
is  not  maintaining  the  self-determining  power  of  the  will  in 
its  fullest  extent,  we  know  not  when,  or  by  whom  it  was  ever 
maintained. 

We  are  aware,  however,  that  the  New  Haven  divines  have 
elsewhere  admitted,  though,  as  we  think,  very  inconsistently, 
that  God  might  have  secured  obedience  in  particular  instances 
in  which  he  has  not  secured  it.  But  they  contend,  that  had  he 
done  so,  it  might  have  resulted  in  a  vast  increase  of  sin  on  the 
whole.  Thus  Dr.  Taylor  says  in  the  note  to  his  Concio  ad 
Clerum. 

"  Had  he  prevented  the  sins  of  one  human  being  to  the  present  time,  or  had 
he  brought  to  repentance  one  sinner  more  than  he  has,  who  can  prove  that  the 
requisite  interposition  for  the  purpose,  would  not  result  in  a  vast  increase  of 
sin  in  the  system,  including  even  ihe  apostacy  and  augmented  guilt  of  that 
individual!" 

We  have  a  remark  or  two  to  make  in  reference  to  this  theory. 

1.  It  is,  as  we  have  seen,  altogether  inconsistent  with  their 
favorite  position.  If  in  any  instance  in  which  sin  exists,  God 
could,  by  any  interposition,  have  secured  holiness  in  its  stead; 
then,  in  that  instance,  he  did  not  prefer,  all  things  considered, 
holiness  to  sin;  for  there  was  one  consideration  which  induced 
him  to  prefer  sin  to  holiness  in  that  instance,  viz.,  rather  than 
exert  the  requisite  interposition,  he  preferred  that  the  sin  should 
exist  instead  of  the  holiness  which  he  might  have  secured. 
Consequently,  he  does  not  prefer,  all  things  considered,  holiness 
to  sin  in  all  instances.  There  are  instances,  in  which  he  per- 
mits acts  of  disobedience,  when  he  might  have  secured  obedi- 
ence; and  if  he  does  so,  he  doubtless,  on  the  whole,  prefers 
to  do  so.  They  must,  therefore,  give  up  this  theory,  or  aban- 
don their  favorite  position. 

But  2.  What  reason  can  there  be  to  suppose  that  the  pre- 
vention of  sin  in  one  part  of  the  system,  will  tend  to  promote 
its  prevalence  in  another  part?  Do  these  divines  suppose, 
that  the  empire  of  Jehovah  is  too  vast  for  him  to  manage? — that 
he  cannot  watch  over  every  part  of  it  at  the  same  time? — that 
in  order  to  secure  allegiance  in  one  part  of  his  dominions, 
he  must  necessarily  leave  other  parts  unprotected,  and  exposed 
to  such  fatal  influences  as  will  ensure  revolt?  Is  such  the  char- 
acter of  the  Almighty,  Omniscient,   and  Omnipresent  God? 

But  3.  What  conceivable  tendency  has  the  prevention  of  sin, 
to  promote  the  prevalence  of  sin?     Suppose  the  angels  who  fell, 


21 

had  been  confirmed  in  a  state  of  holiness;  would  their  perseve- 
ring and  cheerful  obedience,  have  been  likely  to  excite  discon- 
tent and  insurrection  among  their  associates?  Suppose  our 
first  parents  had  been  prevented  from  sinning;  would  this 
have  had  any  tendency  to  fill  our  world  with  rebellion,  or  to 
excite  rebellion  in  any  other  world?     But  Dr.  Taylor  says, 

"  Facts,  so  far  as  they  are  known  to  us,  furnish  no  support  to  the  assump- 
tion, thai  God  could  in  a  moral  system  prevent  all  sin,  or  even  the  present 
degree  of  sin.  For  we  knowof  no  creatures  of  God,  whose  holiness  is  secured 
without  that  influence  which  results  either  directly  or  indirectly  from  the 
existence  of  sin  and  its  punishment.  How  then  can  it  be  shown  from  facts, 
that  God  could  secure  any  of  his  moral  creatures  in  holiness,  without  this  in- 
fluence; or  to  what  purpose  is  it  10  allege  instances  of  the  prevention  of  sin 
under  this  influence,  to  prove  that  God  could  prevent  it  without  this  influence'? 
Rather,  do  not  all  known  facts  furnish  a  strong  presumption  to  the  contrary'? 
If  God  could  prevent  all  sin  without  this  influence,  why  has  he  not  done  it?" 
Concio  ad  Clerum,  p.  33. 

And  is  there  no  influence  which  God  can  exert  upon  the 
minds  of  perfectly  holy  beings,  of  sufficient  power  to  preserve 
them  in  a  state  of  holiness,  without  the  aid  of  sin  and  its  pun- 
ishment? Are  they  so  inclined  to  evil,  that  they  all  would 
rebel,  if  they  could  do  it  with  impunity?  Is  it  slavish  fear  which 
binds  them  to  the  eternal  throne?  And  even  if  the  fear  of  pun- 
ishment were  indispensable  to  secure  their  allegiance,  could 
not  God  inspire  them  with  that  fear  without  placing  before 
them  examples  of  sin  and  punishment?  Could  not  holy  beings 
in  any  way  be  made  to  believe  divine  threatenings  till  they  had 
seen  them  executed?  Is  it  characteristic  of  perfectly  holy  be- 
ings, that  they  have  little  confidence  in  their  Maker's  word?  Are 
the  sin  and  punishment  of  a  part  of  God's  accountable  crea- 
tures, indispensable  as  the  means  of  securing  any  holiness  in 
a  moral  system?  And  is  sin,  indeed,  such  "  a  necessary  means 
of  the  greatest  good?" 

That  God  ever  prefers  sin  to  holiness,  on  its  own  account,  no 
one  pretends.  But  that  he  does  permit  it  to  exist,  when  he 
might  have  secured  holiness  in  its  stead,  all  must  admit,  who 
believe  that  he  has  complete  dominion  over  the  hearts  of  his 
creatures.  This  does  not  imply  that  he  views  sin  with  compla- 
cency, or  takes  any  pleasure  in  it,  in  itself  considered.  A  thing 
may  be,  in  itself  considered,  very  displeasing  to  God,  when,  all 
things  considered,  it  may  be  his  pleasure  that  it  should  exist. 
For  example: — In  itself  considered,  God  has  no  pleasure  in  the 
death  of  the  wicked;  but,  all  things  considered,  it  is  his  pleasure 
that  the  wicked  should  die;  otherwise,  he  will  act  contrary  to 
his  pleasure,  when  he  shall  doom  them  to  the  miseries  of  the 
second  death.     In  itself  considered,  God  had  no  pleasure  in  the 


22 

sufferings  of  his  Son;  but,  all  tilings  considered,  it  was  his  pleas- 
ure that  his  Son  should  suffer;  for  it  pleased  the  Lord  to  bruise 
him.  In  itself  considered,  God  has  no  pleasure  in  the  afflictions 
of  his  people;  for  he  doth  not  afflict  loillingly;  but,  all  things 
considered,  it  is  his  pleasure  to  afflict  them;  for  whom  the  Lord 
loveth,  he  chasteneth.  This  distinction  is  very  important,  and 
without  keeping  it  in  view,  it  is  impossible  to  reconcile  different 
parts  of  the  scriptures  with  each  other,  and  the  perfections  of 
God  with  facts.  It  is  therefore  no  contradiction  to  say,  that 
although  God  does  not  prefer  sin  to  holiness,  in  any  instance, 
for  its  own  sake,  yet  he  does  prefer,  all  things  considered,  that 
it  should  exist,  to  some  extent,  instead  of  holiness,  in  his  king- 
dom. This  we  must  admit,  or  be  driven  to  the  conclusion, 
that  it  is  beyond  the  power  of  God  to  prevent  a  single  sin 
which  ever  has  been  committed,  or  which  ever  will  be  commit- 
ted, by  securing  holiness  in  its  stead.  We  might  quote  largely 
on  this  subject  from  the  writings  of  the  New  Haven  divines; 
but  we  will  add  but  one  extract  more,  and  this  for  the  purpose 
of  showing  the  great  importance  which  they  attach  to  their 
theory,  by  representing  the  opposite  theory  as  leading  by  legiti- 
mate consequence,  to  the  most  destructive  errors. 

"  This  theory,  if  carried  out  into  its  legitimate  consequences,  leads  to  uni- 
versalism,  to  infidelity,  and  to  atheism.  Dr.  Tyler  maintains,  that  God  really 
prefers  the  holiness  and  happiness  of  all  his  moral  creatures  to  their  sin  and 
perdition.  But  Dr.  Tyler  also  maintains,  that  God  can  execute  this  prefer- 
ence, i.  e.  can  secure  the  holiness  and  happiness  of  all  his  moral  creatures. 
It  follows  therefore,  that  God  will  secure  the  holiness  and  happiness  of  all 
his  moral  creatures.  Of  course,  all  men  will  be  saved.  But  this  is  not  all. 
According  to  this  scheme,  the  divine  authority  of  the  Bible  is  subverted. 
This  book  confessedly  abounds  in  the  most  ur  qualified  declarations  of  the  fu- 
ture endless  misery  of  multitudes  of  the  human  race.  But  how  can  a  book, 
which  so  explicitly  contradicts  demonstrable,  known  truth,  be  divine]  Es- 
pecially how  can  a  book,  pretend  to  claim  an  Omnipotent  and  a  benevolent 
God  for  its  author,  while  it  exhibits  him  as  creating  myriads  of  beings,  be- 
cause he  prefers,  on  the  whole,  their  sin  arid  everlasting  misery,  to  their  per- 
fect holiness  and  happiness]  As  an  Omnipotent  Being,  he  can,  according 
to  Dr.  Tyler,  prevent  such  a  result.  As  a  benevolent  Being,  he  must  be  dispo- 
sed to  prevent  it.  But,  according  to  Dr.  Tyler,  the  Scriptures  clearly  teach, 
that  God  will  not  secure  the  perfect  holiness  and  happiness  of  his  moral  crea- 
tion, when  he  can  secure  it.  How  then  can  a  book,  which  belies  every  essen- 
tial attribute  of  a  perfect  God,  pretend  to  claim  his  authority]  Apply,  now, 
the  principles  of  Dr.  Tyler  in  another  form,  and  atheism  is  the  consequence. 
Dr.  Tyler  will  admit,  that  God  is  disposed  to  prevent  all  evil,  in  itself  con- 
sidered, throughout  his  creation;  and  that  this  disposition  is  as  real  a  prefer- 
ence of  the  Divine  Being,  as  any  other.  But  Dr.  Tyler  maintains  also,  that 
God  can  prevent  all  evil  throughout  his  creation.  The  argument  then  for 
atheism  furnished  by  this  theory,  may  be  thus  stated: — If  there  were  a  God, 
that  is,  a  being  of  infinite  power  and  goodness,  he  could  prevent,  and  would 
be  disposed,  and  therefore  would  in  fact,  prevent  all  evil  throughout  his 
creation.  But  evil  exists.  Therefore,  there  is  not  a  being  of  infinite  power 
and  goodness — there  is  no  God."    I'  We  admit  the  fact  that  the  foregoing 


23 

reasoning  is  that  of  the  univcrsalist,  the  infidel,  and  the  atheist.  But  we  ask, 
who  furnishes  and  sustains  the  premises'?  And  what  conclusions,  when  the 
premises  are  admitted,  are  more  unanswerable?''  "We  cannot  but  say, 
what  we  believe  in  the  integrity  of  our  heart,  that  supralapsarian  Calvinists 
furnish  the  grand  principle  on  which  these  conclusions  rpst;  and  combining 
their  powers  of  argument  in  its  defence,  with  ail  their  means  of  influencing  the 
faith  of  others,  give  to  it  and  the  conclusions  founded  on  ii,  a  delusive  and 
fearful  infallibility  in  the  minds  of  thousands.  The  principle  is,  that  an  Om- 
nipotent God,  by  the  mere  dint  of  power,  can  secure  the  universal  holiness  and 
happiness  oj  his  moral  creatures."  "  We  cannot  but  say,  that  in  our  honest 
belief,  the  advocates  of  this  principle,  greatly,  but  inconsiderately,  contribute 
to  the  support  of  the  most  destructive  errors."  "  Sure  we  are,  that  a  very 
limited  acquaintance  with  facts,  would  show  that  the  principle  advocated  by 
Dr.  Tyler  and  others,  is  the  very  same,  which,  in  the  hands  of  Voltaire  and 
other  enemies  of  the  gospel,  has  spread  infidelity  and  atheism  to  such  a  fear- 
ful extent  throughout  Europe,  and  is,  in  fact,  the  basis  of  all  that  latitudina- 
rianism,  which  rejects  Christianity,  and  calmly  reposes  on  false  and  unde- 
fined notions  of  the  goodness  and  power  of  God."  Ch.  Spec.  1832.  pp. 
481—483. 

According  to  these  statements,  those  who  hold,  with  Presi- 
dent Day,  that  God  possesses  unlimited  control  over  the  moral 
actions  of  his  creatures,  have  no  alternative  left  them,  but  to 
become  universalists,  or  give  up  the  Bible,  and  take  refuge  in 
atheism.  They  furnish  the  premises  on  which  the  universalist, 
the  infidel,  and  the  atheist,  have  constructed  unanswerable  argu- 
ments in  favor  of  their  respective  systems.  We  are,  of  course, 
to  believe,  that  those  divines  who  admit  this  doctrine,  have 
never  yet  fairly  met  the  objections  of  these  enemies  of  the 
truth.  The  work  of  Edwards  against  Cbauncey,  and  Strong's 
Benevolence  and  Misery,  which  have  heretofore  been  consider- 
ed triumphant  refutations  of  the  system  of  universalism,  are  to  be 
set  down  as  utter  failures.  And  not  only  so,  but  the  great  body 
of  calvinistic  divines,  have  been  co-workers  with  Voltaire,  and 
other  enemies  of  the  gospel,  in  spreading  infidelity  and  atheism 
to  such  a  fearful  extent  throughout  Europe.  With  these  divines 
is  now  to  be  classed,  the  \enerable  President  of  Yale  College, 
together  with  his  illustrious  predecessor! 

*We  have  been  led  more  particularly  to  compare  the  views 
maintained  by  President  Day  in  the  treatise  before  us,  with  the 
writings  of  the  New  Haven  divines,  on  account  of  the  notice 
which  they  have  taken  of  the  work,  in  a  recent  number  of  the 
Christian  Spectator.  Strange  as  it  may  seem,  they  speak  of 
it  in  terms  of  high  commendation,  and  hail  it  as  "  a  valuable 
auxiliary  in  the  defence  of  important  truth."  They  go  so  far 
as  to  say,  that  they  cannot  find  a  syllable  in  it  which  militates 
against  "the  real  sentiments  of  Dr.  Taylor.  And  what  do  they 
mean  by  this?  Do  they  mean  that  they  are  now  convinced  that 
the  theory  which  Dr.  Taylor  has  propounded,   and   labored  so 


24 

hard  to  defend,  and  to  the  defence  of  which,  so  large  a  portion 
of  their  periodical  has  been  devoted  for  the  last  ten  years, 
is  unfounded?  Are  they  disposed  to  retract,  and  to  caution 
their  readers  against  being  misled  by  their  past  speculations  on 
this  subject?  If  this  were  the  case,  it  would  give  us  unfeigned 
joy.  But  nothing  like  this  is  intimated.  On  the  contrary,  the 
whole  strain  of  their  remarks,  seems  intended  to  make  the  im- 
pression that  the  views  of  President  Day,  are  the  very  views 
which  they  have  uniformly  maintained.  This  representation 
would  have  filled  us  with  unmingled  astonishment,  if  we  had 
witnessed  nothing  of  the  kind  before.  But  we  have  not  for- 
gotten who  it  was,  that  once  charged  an  opponent  with  main- 
taining theories  which  lead  to  the  "  worst  of  heresies," — even 
"  universalism,  infidelity  and  atheism,'"'  — theories  that  involve 
the  positions  that  "  God  is  the  responsible  author  of  sin," — 
that  "  sin  is  a  good  thing — good  in  its  nature  and  tendency," — 
that  "God  is  a  criminal  tempter," — that  "  the  divine  lawgiver 
is  a  deceiver,"  and  other  consequences  equally  shocking  and 
blasphemous;  and  afterwards,  without  retracting  a  syllable  which 
he  had  written,  or  attempting  to  show  that  his  opponent  had 
retracted  any  thing,  turned  around  and  said,  "  we  are  perfectly 
agreed."  We  have  not  forgotten  the  Review  of  Bellamy's 
treatise  on  the  Wisdom  of  God  in  the  permission  of  sin,  in 
which  an  attempt  was  made  to  fasten  upon  that  distinguished 
theologian  the  very  sentiments  which  it  was  his  object  to  refute. 
We  have  not  forgotten  the  use  which  has  been  made  of  the 
names  of  Edwards,  Dwight,  and  Strong,  to  say  nothing  of  living 
men.  But  we  will  let  this  pass,  and  leave  the  reviewers  to  ac- 
count for  the  above  representation  intheir  own  way.  Of  one 
thing  we  are  certain,  that  the  great  mass  of  readers  have  under- 
stood them  to  maintain  views  utterly  irreconcilable  with  those 
inculcated  in  the  treatise  of  President  Day.  If  it  is  not  his  ob- 
ject to  defend  the  doctrine  of  God's  entire  control  over  the 
moral  actions  of  his  creatures;  and  if  it  has  not  been  their 
ohject  to  call  this  doctrine  in  question,  we  certainly  have  not 
understood  either  him  or  them.  And  we  despair,  moreover,  of 
ever  ascertaining  the  opinions  of  any  man,  from  his  own  writ- 
ten statements.  If  they  are  convinced  of  their  error,  let  them 
like  honest  men  and  christians,  publish  their  retractions.  But 
what  they  have  written,  they  have  written.  And  so  long  as  it  is 
permitted  to  stand  unretracted,  we  are  compelled  to  believe  that 
it  expresses  their  present  real  sentiments. 

"  But  President  Day,"  they  tell  us,    "  does  not  reason  on 
the  theory  that  sin  is  the  necessary  means  of  the  greatest  good, 


8S 

or  that  the  present  system  of  the  universe  was  chosen  for  the1 
.sake  of  the  sin  which  it  contains.'1  And  who  ever  did  reason 
on  this  theory?  "What  theologian  ever  maintained  that  "the 
present  system  of  the  universe  was  chosen  for  the  sake  of 
the  sin  which  it  contains?"  Or  that  "  sin  is  the  necessary 
means  of  the  greatest  good,"  in  the  sense  in  which  they  have 
interpreted  this  language?  What  is  the  theory  that  sin  is  the 
necessary  means  of  the  greatest  good?  They  tell  us  that  "  it 
is  equivalent  to  saying  that  sin  is  a  good  thing — even  the  best 
thing,"  and  that  "  when  men  sin,  they  do  the  very  best  thing 
they  can  do."  They  tell  us,  moreover,  that  to  maintain  that 
God  overrules  sin  for  good,  by  counteracting  its  tendencies,  is 
directly  to  contradict  this  theory.  We  ask  then  again,  who 
ever  maintained  this  theory?  We  wish  here  to  make  a  few  re- 
marks, for  the  purpose  of  exposing  the  injustice  which  has 
been  done  to  the  great  body  of  Calvinistic  divines. 

The  position  that  "  sin  is  the  necessary  means  of  the  great- 
est good,"  so  far  as  we  know,  was  first  brought  into  use  by 
the  New  Haven  divines  themselves.  Dr.  Taylor,  in  the  note  to 
his  Concio  ad  Clerum,  said  that  it  is  a  common  assumption 
that  sin  is  the  necessary  means  of  the  greatest  good.  The  lan- 
guage was  not  quoted,  nor  have  we  been  able  to  find  it  in  the 
writings  of  any  of  our  standard  divines.  It  was  language  which 
he  employed  to  characterize  the  commonly  received  opinion 
in  relation  to  the  divine  permission  of  sin.  In  the  contro- 
versy which  followed,  some  of  his  opponents  vindicated  this 
position,  supposing  that  he  meant  by  it  what  they  knew  to  be 
the  commonly  received  opinion  on  the  subject,  viz.,  that  God 
will  overrule  all  the  sin  which  exists,  and  so  counteract  its 
tendencies  as  to  bring  to  pass  a  greater  amount  of  good  than  if 
sin  had  not  existed.  They  were  careful  to  explain  the  sense  in 
which  they  vindicated  it.  They  stated  explicitly,  that  sin  in  its 
own  niture,  is  evil,  and  infinitely  hateful  to  God,  that  its 
tendency  is  to  evil,  and  evil  only;  and  that  it  is  never  made 
the  means  or  occasion  of  good,  except  by  being  overruled  and 
counteracted  in  its  tendencies. 

But  Dr.  Taylor  subsequently  insisted,  that  the  position 
means,  that  "  sin  is  a  good  thing — good  in  its  nature  and  ten- 
dency," and  that  "  when  men  sin  they  do  the  best  thing  they 
can  do;"  and  he  made  his  opponents  responsible  for  it  in  this 
odious  sense,  because  they  had  vindicated  it  in  an  entirely  differ- 
ent sense;  and  from  that  time  to  this,  the  Christian  Spectator 
lias  been  constantly  ringing  changes  upon  this  phraseology,  and 
the  great  body  of  Calvinistic  divines  are  represented  as  maintain- 


25 

inc  the  theory  in  the  sense  which  they  have  attached  to  it; 
when  they  know,  that  so  far  from  maintaining  it,  they  reject  it 
with  abhorrence.  Now  we  appeal  to  every  unprejudiced  read- 
er, whether  this  is  not  a  most  unjust  and  slanderous  imputation. 
Let  it  be  remembered,  whence  this  position  originated.  Let 
it  also  be  remembered  that  those  who  vindicated  it  in  the  sense 
in  which  they  supposed  it  was  intended  to  be  understood,  were 
not  pieased  with  the  language.  It  was  language  which  they 
would  not  have  chosen  to  express  their  own  views,  orthecom- 
monly  received  views  on  the  subject.  The  writer  of  this  article, 
in  his  controversy  with  Dr.  Taylor,  said  expressly,  "  It  is  not 
a  position  of  my  coining,  nor  one  which  I  ever  should  have 
coined.  I  have  no  wish  to  vindicate  this  particular  phraseology. 
I  never  considered  it  a  happy  mode  of  expression.  It  is  the 
language  which  Dr.  Taylor  has  chosen  to  exhibit  the  views  of 
his  brethren." 

The  question  is  not  whether  this  position  means  what  they 
eay  it  means.  If  it  does,  then  by  saying  that  it  is  "a  common 
assumption,"  they  have  grossly  misrepresented  the  views  of 
their  brethren,  and  they  are  bound  to  make  a  full  and  frank 
retraction  of  their  statements.  They  have  openly,  and  before 
the  world,  charged  their  brethren  with  holding  what  they  say  is 
equivalent  to  the  declaration  that  "  sin  is  a  good  thing,"  and 
that  "  when  men  sin,  they  do  the  best  thing  they  can  do;'r 
when  they  know  that  such  a  sentiment  could  not  be  maintained 
without  the  most  heaven-daring  impiety.  And  they  persist  in 
doing  it.  Scarcely  a  number  of  their  periodical  issues  from 
the- press,  in  which  this  subject  is  not  brought  into  view. 

"  But  President  Day  does  not  reason  on  the  theory  that  sin  is 
the  necessary  means  of  the  greatest  good."  Very  true.  And 
who  ever  did,  if  the  theory  be  what  they  say  it  is?  But  is  any 
thing  which  President  Day  has  said,  inconsistent  with  the  com- 
monly received  views  on  this  subject?  That  God  could  have 
prevented  all  sin  in  a  moral  system,  he  not  only  admits,  but 
has  conclusively  shown.  And  why  does  he  suppose  that  God 
permitted  sin  to  exist?  Because  it  could  not  be  excluded  from 
the  best  moral  system;  in  other  words,  because  the  system  is  bet- 
ter as  it  is,  than  it  would  have  been  if  sin  had  been  entirely  ex- 
cluded. He  maintains  that  God  will  secure  the  greatest  pos- 
sible amount  of  good.  But  he  does  not  suppose  that  sin  is 
good,  or  that  it  tends  to  good.  On  the  contrary,  he  supposes 
that  its  tendencies  are  all  evil.  And  who  ever  denied  this? — 
Who  ever  maintained  that  sin  is  the  direct  means  of  good,  or 
that   "  the  present  system  was  chosen  for  the  sake  of  the  sin 


27 

which  it  contains?"  But  does  President  Day  deny  that  God  can 
overrule  sin  for  good — that  he  can  counteract  its  tendencies, 
and  thus  not  only  present  the  evil  to  which  it  tends,  but  take 
occasion  from  its  existence,  to  make  displays  of  his  character, 
which  he  could  not  make,  if  sin  did  not  exist;  and  in  this  way, 
secure  an  amount  of  good,  which  otherwise  would  not  be  real- 
ized? He  maintains  that  the  present  system  is  the  best  possible 
system;  and  at  the  same  time  maintains  that  God  might  hav.e 
had  a  moral  system,  from  which  sin  should  be  entirely  exclu- 
ded. He  consequently  maintains  that  God  had  wise  and  benev- 
olent ends  to  answer  by  the  permission  of  sin.  He  permitted  it 
to  exist,  not  because  he  could  not  prevent  it  in  a  moral  system, 
but  because  he  saw  that  he  could  accomplish  a  greater  good 
by  permitting  it,  than  by  preventing  it.  This  is  all,  for  which 
Calvinists  generally  have  contended.  If  then  it  is  "a  ccnncn 
assumption,  that  sin  is  the  necessary  means  of  the  greatest 
good,"  we  fear  that  President  Day  will  hardly  escape  the  im- 
putation, his  explicit  declaration  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding. 
The  real  point  of  dispute  on  this  subject,  relates  to  the  power 
of  God  over  the  hearts  of  moral  agents.  Are  they  completely 
under  his  control?  If  they  are,  the  theory  of  the  New  Haven 
divines  cannot  stand.  What  President  Day's  views  are  in  re- 
lation to  this  point,  we  have  already  seen.  To  establish  the 
affirmative  of  this  question,  is  the  great  object  for  which  he  has 
written  his  book. 

There  is  another  topic  touched  upon  by  these  reviewers,  on 
which  we  wish  to  make  a  few  remarks.  After  referring  to  Pres- 
ident Day's  classification  of  the  acts  of  the  will  into  emot.ons, 
purposes,  and  executive  volitions,  they  say, 

"Our  readers  are  already  familiar  with  this  classification,  which  has  been 
used  in  our  discussions  for  many  years.  They  are  probably  aware,  toe,  that 
we  have  suffered  some  reproach  on  this  account.  We  have  spoken  of  the 
controlling  disposition  of  unrenewed  men.  as  a.  generic  volition,  or  governing 
purpose  of  the  soul;  and  of  the  change  in  regeneration,  as  a  permanent 
change  in  this  purpose,  (i.  e.  disposition)  produced  Ly  the  special  influence 
oTthe  Holy  Spirit ;  and  for  sodoing,  we  have  been  stigmatized  as  heretics.  We 
shall  hope,  under  the  shelter  of  President  Day^s  authority,  to  escape  any 
further  r?proacli  for  the  use  of  these  terms."  p.  176. 

Unpleasant  as  it  may  be  to  dislodge  these  reviewers  from 
so  comfortable  a  shelter,  a  regard  to  truth  obliges  us  to  do  it. 
Whether  this  classification  of  the  acts  of  the  will,  is  one  which 
they  have  been  in  the  habit  of  making,  we  shall  not  stop  now 
to  inquire.  All  that  we  have  to  say  on  this  point,  is,  that  we 
do  not  recollect  to  have  seen  it  in  their  writings.  Be  this, 
however,  as  it  may,  we  are  very  confident  that  their  views  of 


28 

regeneration  will  not  at  all  comport  with  the  principles  laid 
down  and  established  by  President  Day.  Does  he  believe  that 
the  change  in  regeneration  has  its  seat  in  the  governing  pur- 
pose of  the  soul,  or  in  the  affections  which  lie  back  of  this 
purpose,  and  which  decide  its  character?  According  to  him, 
the  purposes  of  the  mind  depend  on  the  emotions  or  affections. 
When  a  man  resolves  on  a  course  of  conduct,  it  is  to  gratify 
some  feeling  or  desire  of  the  mind.  This  constitutes  the  in- 
ternal motive  of  the  choice,  and  decides  its  character.  The 
purpose  is  right  or  wrong,  sinful  or  holy,  according  to  the  inter- 
nal motive  which  prompts  it.  It  is  with  purposes,  as  with  ex- 
ternal actions;  they  derive  their  character  solely  from  the  motives 
from  which  they  flow.  For  not  only  the  same  external  actions, 
but  the  same  purposes,  may  flow  from  very  different  motives. 
For  example: — Suppose  that  a  man  lives  a  strictly  religious  life, 
so  far  as  outward  conduct  is  concerned.  This  he  may  do,  either 
because  he  loves  God,  and  delights  in  his  service,  or  solely  for 
the  sake  of  obtaining  everlasting  happiness.  If  the  former  be 
his  motive,  he  is  a  saint;  if  the  latter,  he  is  a  pharisee.  The 
character  of  his  conduct  depends  entirely  on  the  character  of 
the  internal  motive  by  which  he  is  influenced.  Just  so  with  a 
governing  purpose  of  the  mind.  A  man  resolves  to  live  a  strict- 
ly religious  life.  This  he  may  do  from  either  of  the  motives 
above  specified;  and  his  purpose  will,  of  course,  be  right  or 
wrong,  according  to  the  motive.  This,  if  we  understand 
him,  is  President  Day's  view  of  the  matter.  According  to 
him,  then,  the  seat  of  moral  action  is  in  the  affections.  It  is 
of  these,  that  right  and  wrong  are  ultimately  predicated.  What, 
then,  is  the  change  in  regeneration  ?  Most  evidently,  if  it  is  a 
change  of  moral  character,  it  is  a  change  of  the  affections; — not 
merely  a  change  of  the  governing  purpose  of  the  mind,  but  a 
change  of  the  internal  motive  which  prompts  the  purpose,  and 
decides  its  character.  To  illustrate  the  point: — Suppose  a  man 
has,  for  a  course  of  years,  been  devoted  to  the  pursuit  of  world- 
ly good.  The  motive  by  which  he  has  been  prompted,  is  the 
desire  of  securing  his  own  happiness.  But  he  becomes  con- 
vinced that  this  course  of  conduct  will  lead  to  interminable 
misery,  and  that  the  only  way  to  obtain  true  and  lasting  happi- 
ness, is,  to  devote  himself  to  the  service  of  God.  Accordingly, 
he  resolves  to  change  his  course,  and  to  become  strictly  a  reli- 
gious man; — all,  let  it  be  remembered,  for  the  sake  of  securing 
his  own  personal  happiness.  Here  is  a  change  of  the  govern- 
ing purpose  of  the  mind,  but  there  is  no  change  of  motive. 
His  purpose  to    serve  God,    is  prompted  by  precisely  the  same 


29 

internal  motive,  as  his  previous  purpose  to  serve  the  world.  In 
this  regeneration?  That  it  is  often  mistaken  for  regeneration, 
we  cannot  doubt.  Indeed,  we  are  persuaded  that  this  is  the 
way  in  which  spurious  conversions  usually  take  place.  Hun- 
dreds and  thousands,  we  fear,  have  thus  mistaken  a  change  of 
purpose,  without  any  change  of  motive,  for  a  change  of  heart, 
and  have  rested  on  a  hope  which  will  make  ashamed  when  God 
takes  away  the  soul. 

But  do  the  writings  of  the  New  Haven  divines  give  coun- 
tenance to  any  such  view  of  regeneration?  Let  the  reader  care- 
fully examine  the  following  passage,  and  judge  for  himself. 

"  There  is  no  more  difficulty  in  accounting  for  the  fact,  that  the  yielding 
sinner  supremely  loves  God,  from  the  impulse  of  a  regard  to  his  own  happi- 
ness, than  there  is  in  explaining  the  opposite  fact,  of  his  having  formerly, 
under  the  influence  of  the  same  principle,  when  perverted,  supremely  loved 
idols;  which,  though  contrary  to  his  reason  and  conscience,  his  heart  wick- 
edly preferred  as  his  highest  good.  The  self-love  that  was  previously  in  ser- 
vitude to  his  selfish  inclinations,  and  perverted  by  their  unhallowed  influence, 
now  breaks  away  from  that  servitude,  as  his  soul,  under  the  power  of  light 
and  motives  rendered  effectual  by  the  Holy  Ghost,  is  made  to  see  and  feel 
where  its  true  interest  lies.  And  no  sooner  is  this  duty  seen  and  felt,  through 
the  influence  of  the  spirit,  than  the  man  who  is  so  constituted  that  he  must 
have  a  regard  to  what  he  views  as  his  own  highest  good,  at  once  chooses 
Christ  and  his  service  as  the  means  of  securing  it."  Ch.  Spec.  1833.  pp.  357, 
358. 

We  might  quote  many  passages  which  contain  substantially 
the  same  views.  And  what  is  the  import  of  this  language?  Is 
it  not  most  clearly,  that  regeneration  implies  no  change  in  the 
internal  motive  by  which  man  is  influenced? — that  the  yielding 
sinner  acts  "  under  the  influence  of  the  same  principle"  as  that 
by  which  he  was  influenced  when  he  served  his  idols?  This 
we  have  long  regarded  as  one  of  the  most  dangerous  errors  of 
the  New  Haven  system.  We  cannot  refrain  from  expressing 
our  solemn  conviction,  that  those  who  have  experienced  no 
other  regeneration  than  that  which  accords  with  the  above  rep- 
resentation, have  never  been  renewed  by  tire  Spirit  of  God. 

But  important  as  this  topic  is,  we  cannot  dwell  longeron  it 
at  present.  We  will  only  add,  that  nothing  which  President 
Day  has  written,  can  possibly  be  so  construed  as  to  favor  these 
views,  without  grossly  perverting  his  language. 

In  conclusion  we  would  say,  that  we  regard  the  treatise  before 
us,  as  eminently  calculated  to  do  good,  at  the  present  day.  We 
hope  it  will  be  extensively  circulated  and  read.  We  could  wish 
it  might  find  a  place  in  the  library  of  every  minister  in  our 
country;  and  especially,  that  it  might  be  carefully  studied  by 
every  theological  student.     President  Day  has  rendered  an  im- 


30 

portant  service  to  the  Church;  and  our  prayer  is,  that  he  may 
live  to  see  much  fruit  of  his  lahor. 

To  the  wish  expressed  by  the  conductors  of  the  Christian 
Spectator,  that  the  work  of  Fresident  Day  "  may  prove  a  com- 
mon ground  on  which  brethren  who  have  differed,  may  meet  in 
peace,"  we  respond  our  hearty  Amen.  It  is  the  very  ground  on 
which  we  have  longed  wished  for  union.  It  is  the  very  ground 
on  which  the  ministers  of  New  England  were  so  long,  and  so 
happily  united,  till  theirranks  were  broken  by  the  recent  specu- 
lations, and  boasted  theological  improvements,  if  those  who 
have  caused  the  division,  are  now  disposed  to  lval  the  breach, 
by  returning  to  the  ground  from  which  they  hive  departed,  their 
course  is  plain.  Let  them  evince  their  sincerity,  by  frankly 
and  openly  renouncing  their  favorite  theories,  and  doing  what 
they  can  to  counteract  their  dangerous  influence  upon  the  pub- 
lic mind.  When  they  shall  do  this,  they  will  find  no  obsticles 
on  the  part  of  their  brethren  to  a  cordi  1  and  happy  union,  hut 
with  what  consistency,  or  sincerity,  can  they  propose  to  meet 
on  the  ground  above  specified,  so  long  as  all  which  thay  have 
written  and  published,  stands  unretracted,  to  influence  the  faith 
of  the  present,  and  future  generations? 


1012  01082  0258 


DATE  DUE 

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M$P#"P8| 

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GAYLORD 

PRINTED  IN  USA. 

